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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
A significant issue for both housing and urban policy is an adequate supply of housing 
to accommodate the current and projected demand for housing. The National Housing 
Supply Council has highlighted the serious shortfall between housing supply and 
demand from households (NHSC 2012). While there are various reasons for this 
undersupply, a key but often overlooked consideration is the financing of residential 
developments. In most cases, without financing (debt, equity or some combination), 
residential development is not possible (Miles et al. 2007). 
Development is all about funding, it is a very capital intensive business so the 
first thing, the middle thing and the last thing and everywhere in between, 
every question, every thought of mine is about the impact of funding. (NSW 
Developer) 
Despite the importance of finance to the supply of new housing in Australia there is a 
lack of understanding within the housing and urban policy community of how the 
financing of residential development works in Australia. But why is such an 
understanding important to housing and urban policy-makers? The development 
approval system is often considered to be the major barrier to housing supply when, in 
reality, the vast majority of schemes will not make it anywhere near the approval 
phase because they are either not financially feasible or, if they are, the developer 
cannot secure the necessary finance to undertake the project. 
There are many policy decisions, particularly those that dictate what a developer can 
and cannot deliver on a development site, which will impact on the potential 
profitability of a development and therefore its chances of being built. There are also 
policy decisions that increase the potential risk of a development, for example 
uncertainty surrounding an approval process or potential infrastructure costs, that may 
mean a bank is unwilling to lend to that particular project due to the nature of that risk. 
Policy decisions that reduce risk and uncertainty can create an environment where 
developments are more likely to proceed and housing subsequently supplied. 
This report is intended to provide an introduction to property finance and is designed 
for those with no or limited knowledge of this area. Its main aim is to provide policy-
makers with a better understanding of how property finance decisions are made and 
how such decisions can affect housing supply. 
Research questions 
This study used primarily a qualitative approach, including a literature review and 
interviews with property developers and financiers operating across three states—
Western Australia, New South Wales and Victoria—in a variety of development 
sectors—high density development, medium density infill development, greenfield 
development, and the affordable housing sector. Formal face-to-face interviews were 
supplemented with informal discussions with key industry players and industry groups. 
Grey literature was also reviewed to provide an assessment of how access to finance 
has changed over the last five years. Available data on bank lending and household 
borrowing were analysed to provide context. In addition, a review of listed company 
annual reports provided information on company structure, performance and access 
to finance. 
This research addressed five key questions. 
Research Question 1: How important is property finance in delivering new housing 
supply? 
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Put simply, property finance for a developer is crucial, no matter what sector they 
operate within: 
Everything we have done comes down to finance. How do we finance it, how 
do we de-risk it, and how do we ensure we can deliver the outcome? (WA 
Community housing Provider) 
Development is all about risk and return; debt finance helps reduce risk for the 
developer and allows those without the upfront capital to undertake projects. It is also 
one of the main reasons why the number of active developers changes so much in the 
Australian housing supply landscape. This was particularly the case in the post GFC 
period. A very clear conclusion from the study is that for some developers, such as 
publicly listed A-REITs (Australian Real Estate Investment Trust), property finance is 
accessible and the issue of finance is not a key determinant of whether developments 
are undertaken. However, many small and medium-sized developers borrowing on a 
project specific basis are finding it very difficult to access finance and this has a direct 
impact on the ability of the development sector to deliver housing supply, particularly 
in the areas dominated by smaller scale developers such as the infill space. 
Research Question 2: What are the sources of finance and how do financiers make 
decisions to lend to a variety of different residential development types and tenures? 
The range of residential finance sources for Australian developers narrowed post- 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) as many of the European banks involved with the 
Australian property market withdrew from Australia. As noted by Allen Consulting 
(2011) the availability of finance was constrained by fewer domestic banks, partly due 
to the withdrawal of regional banks, and the 'retreat of foreign banks'. Residential 
lending is now dominated by the 'big four' banks that now account for around 80 per 
cent of residential development lending (APRA 2013). 
The report discussed how lenders make finance decisions but a common theme is 
that post GFC, financiers are focused on minimising risk by strategies such as: 
 Reducing the proportion of debt finance available to any one project. 
 Only lending to developers with an existing relationship to the financier. 
 Lending into 'safe' development and tenure types with a proven sales record. 
 Setting a series of covenants on such items as pre-sales which reduces the sales 
risk for the financier. 
Research Question 3: How do changing economic conditions (e.g. post Global 
Financial Crisis) have a significant impact on the financing of residential 
developments? 
The GFC had two major impacts on the financing of residential developments. Firstly, 
a number of alternative lending institutions such as European Banks (e.g. Royal Bank 
of Scotland) stopped lending to the Australian property sector thus reducing 
competition in the sector. The banks have also tightened their loan conditions which 
has had the impact of restricting development finance to a significant component of 
the Australian development sector. Pre-sales became essential which created 
problems for many developers and types of development. Access to finance was a 
major cause of the relatively low number of dwellings built in Australia since the GFC. 
Research Question 4: Are there elements within a residential development scheme, 
for example innovative construction methods, a joint venture approach or the 
provision of affordable housing, which affect lending decisions? 
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Any element of a development project that increases risk to a financier is likely to be 
scrutinised by a provider of senior debt finance. The general position is that property 
development is an inherently risky activity already, without adding any additional 
elements of risk. For this reason, innovations are likely to come from smaller 
developers who are able to attract significant equity into projects or larger private 
companies who do not depend on project level finance. Joint ventures (JV) can attract 
a more positive approach from lenders as long as the JV partners can add value to 
the development process and the JV arrangements do not jeopardise the access of 
the lenders to their funds if there are any problems with the development project. 
Smaller apartment products continue to be problematic for lenders. However, 
innovation (such as new construction methods) are possible if: 
 A developer can demonstrate a track record. 
 The financier is confident that there is a market for a product. 
 The project has a high probability of generating an acceptable level of profit. 
 The project provides low risk to a financial institution. 
Research Question 5: How do the actions of property finance stakeholders impact on 
government leverage objectives for the not-for-profit sector and major housing subsidy 
programs such as the National Rental Affordability Scheme (NRAS)? 
The leverage opportunities available for the not-for-profit sector are reasonably 
modest, largely because of the need for lending institutions to treat the loans as cash 
flow loans, rather than loans against assets. The asset base of the sector is growing, 
offering increasing opportunities for leverage but is still small when compared to the 
public housing stock and the equivalent sector in the UK, for example. Continued 
growth in the sector will make it easier for community housing organisations to access 
finance and expand the social housing stock. Institutional funding of the sector at 
scale would accelerate such growth. At present there are relatively limited 
opportunities to generate significant cash flows from affordable housing projects 
because of the reasonably modest incomes of tenants. Subsidy programs such as 
NRAS provide fewer concerns for lenders, although the time required for the lenders 
to understand new schemes can be significant. 
Policy implications 
Residential finance lending policies and strategies are defined and implemented by 
the lending institutions themselves. In this respect housing and urban policy-makers 
are largely powerless to directly influence such institutional policy. Banks and other 
financial institutions base their lending decisions on a defined organisational strategy 
and if a development project meets the risk to return assessment of the institution and 
fits with the overall strategy then the bank will lend to the developer. However, there 
are ways that policy-makers can influence the environment within which the 
development sector operates and therefore the potential risk profile of a development 
making lending to residential projects more attractive. In such a way policy-makers 
can influence funding strategies and potentially address finance as a blockage within 
the development process. 
There are a number of policy implications arising from the research which are 
described below. 
All developers are different 
The study highlights the range of developers active in the Australian housing supply 
sector and the differences between developers in terms of accessing finance. The 
larger, publicly listed companies including those with a REIT structure seemed to have 
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few difficulties in securing finance. Major, national developers focusing on greenfield 
development have largely been unaffected by finance constraints, although there are 
exceptions due to a policy of banks reducing overall exposure to this type of 
development in specific locations. In contrast, smaller developers working on smaller 
scale projects, often of an infill nature requiring project specific funding, continue to 
experience very challenging conditions particularly if they don’t have an exceptional 
track record. 
This is important from a policy perspective because different types of developers will 
respond differently to a range of policy settings. For example, a policy making the 
purchase of new apartments exempt from stamp duty may be positive for a smaller 
scale, infill type developer who may see demand rise but may have a negative impact 
on a land developer. If policy-makers want to stimulate housing supply in a particular 
housing sector, then they need to be aware of the type of developer operating in that 
space and introduce policies that will have the maximum impact on that particular type 
or scale of developer. 
Understanding development feasibility 
Policy-makers need to understand just how their decisions affect residential lending 
through potential development returns and the perceived development risk. 
Section 3.2 of this report explains how development feasibility is calculated. This 
stage of the development process determines whether a development scheme is 
potentially profitable, if it is not then the scheme will get little further than a 
spreadsheet let alone reach the development approval stage. If the developer does 
consider the scheme potentially profitable they then have to persuade the bank to 
make the funds available. The bank will also look closely at the potential scheme 
profitability but also the level of risk involved. If the risk is considered too high, the 
lender may refuse to lend or impose loan covenants which may not work for the 
developer. 
Anything that reduces uncertainty within the development process will have a positive 
impact on the way a lender assesses a development project. Decisions that make 
development more profitable will also have a positive impact on the chances of that 
development going ahead. By creating the conditions for profitable, low risk 
development, policy-makers are increasing the potential for housing supply. Any 
decision that adds to uncertainty, costs or potentially reduces revenue will have the 
opposite effect. Policy-makers therefore need to be aware how their decisions can 
affect potential revenues, cost, risk and profitability within a development. 
From the developer’s perspective, strategic planning decisions should take into 
account development viability and ensure that policies that will make development 
unprofitable, for example density restrictions or imposing minimum heights in low 
value areas, are avoided. If policy-makers are aware of how developers make 
decisions, then they can help deliver plans that are likely to maximise housing supply. 
The greater the chances of profitable development, the lower the risk and the greater 
the probability of banks being willing to lend on development projects. 
Impact of funding constraints on urban policy 
Post GFC, the major supply constraints generated by a lack of access to finance has 
been in the area of infill development, with many smaller developers operating in the 
lower land value sections of the city and providing dwellings at the more affordable 
end of the scale. Many of these 'developers' have returned to their other occupations 
because they are now unable to access finance. These small in-fill developers often 
have lower profit margins and often use family labour chains to reduce construction 
costs. As a result they are able to deliver affordable housing opportunities. A second 
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impact has been the increased focus on pre-sales, especially for pre-sales with a 
larger deposit. This has restricted access for first home buyers seeking an affordable 
product in the new dwelling market. It is likely that these two trends acting together 
have reduced the access of moderate income households to the new dwelling market, 
outside the traditional greenfield development opportunity. 
The importance of residential finance is likely to increase over time as strategic policy 
focuses on infill dwelling supply and the traditional greenfield development dominated 
by the separate house becomes a smaller component of total new dwellings built in 
Australia. Traditional greenfield developments are constructed in stages and do not 
require the level of construction finance required for apartments for example. Peak 
debt exposure for a 100-unit apartment complex is significantly higher than for a 100-
unit lot development. 
Policy-makers therefore, as explained above, need to create the conditions that 
enable developers to deliver profitable, low risk development. If the conditions for 
small and medium scale infill development are not right (and obviously the state of the 
market is another crucial component) then the profitability of such development 
continues to be marginal and high risk therefore unattractive to lending institutions. To 
encourage the (re)entry to the sector of many smaller developers vital in delivering the 
type of housing supply necessary to meet infill targets, conditions need to be right. 
This can be achieved through certainty in the development approval process; avoiding 
delays and unnecessary complications; ensuring equitable infrastructure charging and 
flexibility around issues such as parking requirements which can add significant costs 
to developments and render them unprofitable. Reducing risk and creating such an 
environment will make such lending more attractive to financial institutions. 
De-risk schemes through joint ventures 
Linked to the above, local and state government can aid developers where possible 
by creating joint ventures to help reduce potential development risk, again making a 
scheme more attractive to potential lenders. Joint ventures could be structured in a 
number of ways, and there are examples all over the country but particularly in 
Western Australia through the Department of Housing. Such joint ventures include the 
use of government-owned land, government guarantees to purchase unsold units, 
pre-sales to government and direct profit sharing partnerships. Such joint ventures 
can not only help government meet their housing targets and deliver a range of 
affordable housing options but can make developments that lenders may not 
previously have funded feasible. Innovation can work if there are the appropriate 
guarantees in place for the lending institution. Existing successes should be 
highlighted and held up as examples of what can be achieved with appropriate 
leadership. 
The not-for-profit sector 
There has been considerable work examining the potential for large scale institutional 
funding for the not-for-profit and private rental sectors. Work by Lawson and Lawson 
et al. (2010, 2012, 2013) and Milligan et al. (2013a) identify a number of ways in 
which institutional involvement in both sectors could be stimulated and deliver positive 
housing supply outcomes. Attracting institutional investment into the area of affordable 
housing would have numerous positive outcomes for both the development sector and 
end consumers. Any policy measures that facilitate such institutional involvement 
would be a significant step forward. 
If there is a political will to drive an increase in new housing completions by the not-
for-profit sector in Australia, then the sector will require significantly improved access 
to residential finance. Current completions by the sector in comparison to many other 
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OECD countries are limited and unlikely to change unless better financial 
mechanisms are developed (Lawson et al. 2010). Many community housing 
organisations are developing housing on a relatively small scale through leveraging 
their existing assets and cash flows. Obviously the more assets they have to leverage 
against, the more money they can borrow and the more units deliverable. This is a 
powerful argument for the transfer of state housing assets to the community housing 
sector who can then concentrate on growing the sector through efficient use of such 
assets leveraging the necessary finance for expansion. 
Demonstrating the potential of alternative housing products 
Alternative models of housing supply and ownership through community land trusts 
and shared equity schemes, for example, have the potential to deliver positive 
outcomes. One of the barriers to growth in this area is a reluctance of banks to lend 
money to alternative products. An important role of government is to demonstrate that 
such models are effective and can be low risk investment opportunities. The 
Department of Housing in Western Australia have their Keystart low deposit scheme 
and shared ownership home loan scheme. These schemes have been successful in 
helping thousands of low to moderate income individuals and families into home 
ownership. Lending to individuals who might not otherwise have been able to access 
the private market, the state government has demonstrated such lending is low risk 
and has positive social outcomes. There is a powerful argument for the adoption of 
similar programs elsewhere. The success of shared ownership schemes has 
demonstrated there is a market for such a product and the private sector should 
explore how they could develop similar schemes that would enable households 
access to market housing previously unavailable. 
Involving the financial sector in planning reform 
Given the key role of residential finance in delivering new housing supply identified in 
this research and the key current objective of planning reform in many states is to 
increase the supply of new housing, it is important to include the residential finance 
sector in planning reform consultations. There is not a lot of evidence that this has 
occurred to date in Australia. For example, what aspects of the planning system 
create the most uncertainty and therefore have a negative impact on risk? How can 
the system be made more certain to reduce the potential for delays and the 
associated cost impact on profitability? Reducing risk will not only lead to more 
positive lending decisions but might also have an impact on the loan covenants 
imposed on developers, again making development potentially more profitable. 
Although policy-makers are powerless to influence the strategy and practices of 
financial institutions, the discussion above highlights how they can potentially increase 
housing supply through creating the conditions where finance is less of a barrier to 
housing delivery. Understanding how finance decisions are made and how developers 
make decisions is a vital step in creating the policy conditions that will have a positive 
impact on housing supply. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Development is all about funding, it is a very capital intensive business so the 
first thing, the middle thing and the last thing and everywhere in between, 
every question, every thought of mine is about the impact of funding. (NSW 
Developer) 
Finance is the most important part [of the development process] because 
without it you are stuffed. (WA Developer) 
There are really only two key things I think when we are looking at a project; 
what is the market for the product and how is it going to be funded. (NSW 
Developer) 
Everything we have done comes down to finance. How do we finance it, how 
do we de-risk it and how do we ensure we can deliver the outcome? (WA 
Community housing Provider) 
These comments, collected during the field work for this project, highlight the 
importance of finance in delivering residential development in Australia. The vast 
majority of development involves debt funding. Developers lacking the funds and/or 
are unwilling to take the risk of development using their own capital seek loans from 
financial institutions to fund land purchase but, more often, the actual construction 
phase of the development. Interest is paid on the debt over the life of the loan and 
then the debt repaid when the project is sold. Revenue is only generated at project 
completion so without an initial source of funds there is no way to pay for the cost of 
construction. Therefore without access to finance development cannot proceed. 
Despite the importance of finance to the supply of new housing in Australia, a review 
of recent policy reports suggests that there is a lack of understanding of how the 
financing of residential development works. The aim of this report is to help fill this 
gap. The report is designed to provide readers with a better understanding of the role 
of property finance in the development process and how the availability of finance 
plays a vital role in the delivery of housing. 
Why is such an understanding so important to housing and urban policy-makers? The 
development approval system is often considered to be the major barrier to housing 
supply when, in reality, the vast majority of schemes will not make it anywhere near 
the approval phase because they are either not financially feasible or, if they are, the 
developer cannot secure the necessary finance to undertake the project. 
There are many policy decisions, particularly those that dictate what a developer can 
and cannot deliver on a development site, which will impact on the potential 
profitability of a development and therefore its chances of being built. There are also 
policy decisions that increase the potential risk of a development, for example 
uncertainty surrounding an approval process or potential infrastructure costs, that may 
mean a bank is unwilling to lend to that particular project due to the nature of that risk. 
Therefore it is important to understand that various policy frameworks play a major 
part in determining first, whether a development is likely to be considered viable in the 
first instance and second, whether a lender is prepared to take on the risk of funding 
that project. Policy decisions that reduce risk and uncertainty create an environment 
where developments are more likely to proceed and housing subsequently supplied. 
This report will highlight the importance of property finance to the residential 
development sector and how access to finance varies across the development sector. 
It also discusses development feasibility to help policy-makers understand how 
decisions can affect development profitability and the likelihood of development 
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proceeding. Property lending decisions are framed by a number of quantitative and 
qualitative processes but the basic decision is concentrated on the balance between 
risk and return. Risk is related to the overall market but also the characteristics of the 
individual developer including their nature, scale and track record. Certain types of 
development attract certain types of developer, for example, small scale infill projects 
attract small scale developers, and this report discusses how the availability of finance 
varies by developer type and organisational structure. Such an understanding is 
important in order to explain why certain types of supply, particularly important from a 
policy perspective, are more difficult to stimulate than others and often this is due to 
finance blockages. 
This report is intended to provide an introduction to property finance and is designed 
for those with no or limited knowledge of this area. Its main aim is to provide policy-
makers with a better understanding of how property finance decisions are made and 
how such decisions can affect housing supply. 
1.1 Research methods 
The project addresses five research questions: 
Research Question 1: How important is property finance in delivering new housing 
supply? 
Research Question 2: What are the sources of finance and how do financiers make 
decisions to lend to a variety of different residential development types and tenures? 
Research Question 3: How do changing economic conditions (e.g. post Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC)) have a significant impact on the financing of residential 
developments? 
Research Question 4: Are there elements within a residential development scheme, 
for example innovative construction methods, a joint venture approach or the 
provision of affordable housing, which affect lending decisions? 
Research Question 5: How do the actions of property finance stakeholders impact on 
government leverage objectives for the not-for-profit sector and major housing subsidy 
programs such as the National Rental Affordability Scheme (NRAS)? 
To answer these questions we collected data through interviews with property 
developers and financiers operating across three states—Western Australia, New 
South Wales and Victoria—in a variety of development sectors—high density 
development, medium density infill development, greenfield development, and the 
affordable housing sector. The original intention was to conduct 18 face-to-face 
interviews with 12 of these interviews being financiers and six developers. However, it 
quickly became apparent that there was far more diversity in the practices of 
developers when compared to financiers, so the balance was changed. Developers 
were also acutely aware of the practices of financiers and given the vast majority of 
lending is through the big four banks—Commonwealth, National Australia Bank 
(NAB), Westpac and ANZ. 
As a consequence, we conducted the majority of interviews with property developers 
rather than financiers. In addition financiers, particularly those from the larger banks, 
were less willing to be interviewed about property lending practices due to commercial 
sensitivities. The lack of access to financiers is a limitation of the research but 
sufficient evidence was gathered from the development industry to draw conclusions 
about lending practices. However, the lack of financiers did affect the ability to 
address research question four in as much detail as we would have liked. 
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Individuals were interviewed between November 2012 and August 2013. A list of 
interviews conducted as part of the research is contained in Appendix 1. Individuals 
were typically very senior in their organisation, often a managing director, delivering 
an overview of the finance issues, or they worked in the day-to-day management of 
development projects dealing directly with financial institutions. 
Interviews were semi-structured in nature covering a broad range of issues including: 
 sources of, and access to, property finance 
 project conditions imposed by lenders 
 funding strategies 
 position of finance in the development process 
 finance and project innovations 
 impact of the GFC on lending conditions and finance availability. 
Formal face-to-face interviews were supplemented with informal discussions with key 
industry actors and industry groups such as the Urban Development Industry of 
Australia. Grey literature was also reviewed to provide an assessment of how access 
to finance has changed over the last five years. Available data on bank lending and 
household borrowing were also analysed to provide the context to the demand for 
property finance. In addition, a review of listed company annual reports provided 
information on company structure, performance and access to finance. 
1.2 The report structure 
The report is split into a number of chapters. After a brief review of the research 
methods we take a ‘property finance 101’ approach explaining the structure of the 
development industry and the basics of residential finance. We then examine the role 
of finance in development using a more complex framework in Chapter 3. A key role 
of this chapter is to show how the type and cost of finance can impact on project 
outcomes. Another important aim of this chapter is to examine the issue of pre-sales 
and their impact on project structure and cost. 
Chapter 4 examines the current availability of finance before moving on to assess the 
impact of the GFC on the availability and terms of funding. The report then describes 
how the organisational characteristics of the developer have a major impact on the 
ability of that developer to secure funding. In Chapter 5 we use four case studies to 
analyse the role of finance within four very different types of development—high 
density development,1 medium density infill development,2 greenfield development, 
and affordable housing development. These case studies highlight how finance is not 
a ‘one size fits all’ product and policy-makers need to be aware how the availability of 
finance can vary dramatically by development sector and can have implications for the 
effectiveness of housing and planning policy. 
                                               
1
 High density development refers to apartment buildings that are four or more floors high. 
2
 Medium density development refers to diverse house forms like semi–detached row and terrace 
houses, town houses, villa houses as well low-rise walk up apartments up to three floors. 
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2 PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY FINANCE 
The objective of this chapter is to review literature on the financing of residential 
developments and to provide a basic framework for understanding residential property 
finance. In order to establish this framework, the chapter starts by providing a 
description of the range of residential property developers operating in Australia. 
One key feature of the housing market is that demand for new housing, while 
connected to key demographic issues, is also inextricably linked to the level of 
economic activity—the business cycle, as well as interest rates. When economic 
activity is contracting, there is a 'knock on' effect with lower demand and confidence 
being transmitted to the residential property market. Residential property developers 
and financiers knowingly operate in this economic environment and pricing adjusts to 
meet demand and, at the same time, stimulates supply (Isaac et al. 2010). 
Rather than evaluating economic demand and supply theory, this literature review 
focuses on the operation of the Australian residential development market and the 
role finance plays in that marketplace. The literature review covers five issues: 
1. Australian housing supply market—details the size and importance of the 
Australian housing market alongside information on the stakeholders. 
2. Residential property developers—presents information on the composition of the 
developers operating in the residential market. 
3. Residential property financiers—identifies the different forms of debt offered by 
financiers alongside the past and current structure of the residential development 
lending market. 
4. Residential finance development risk—explains the risks associated with financing 
residential property developments. 
5. Property finance measurements—details common financial measures selected by 
lenders to assess the suitability of the residential property development. Examples 
are provided on the quantitative approaches. 
2.1 Australian housing market 
As at 30 June 2011, the Australian housing market had an estimated 9.29 million 
dwellings. This is an increase of 142 000 (1.6%) from June 2010. The National 
Housing Supply Council estimates this annual growth figure was below the level of 
underlying demand by approximately 13 000 dwellings. The considerable divergence 
of demand and supply has several contributing factors including financial barriers to 
additional housing supply (NHSC 2012). 
The estimated imbalance between underlying demand and supply hides the structural 
changes occurring in the Australian residential property market. Overall, the traditional 
detached house is the main type of dwelling although multi-unit housing supply is 
growing rapidly in many states. Table 1 below shows the composition of the Australian 
housing market over the 10 years to 2011. 
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Table 1: Recent changes in Australian dwelling structure 
Types 2001 2011 Difference 
Separate house 5,327,309 5,864,574 10.1% 
Semi-detached, terrace house, 
townhouse etc. 
632,176 765,980 21.2% 
Flat, unit or apartment 923,139 1,056,237 14.4% 
Source: ABS Census 2001, 2011 
Table 1 illustrates that separate houses represent approximately 75 per cent of total 
Australian dwellings and is still the main focus of new supply over the past decade 
with 537 000 dwellings constructed compared to multi-unit housing of 266 000 
dwellings. However, recent housing approval data shows a swing towards multi-unit 
housing dwellings. For example, in 2012, nearly 40 per cent of new housing 
development approvals were for multi-unit housing dwellings (Perkins 2013). 
While a number of demand factors have influenced this push for higher density living, 
there has also been a desire by state governments to restrain urban sprawl in the 
major Australian cities and to better use existing infrastructure. This is evident within 
strategic planning documents which outline increased infill targets. 
Figure 1: Changing spatial distribution of the Australian population 
 
Source: Advisor Panel 2010 
Figure 1 illustrates the change in the balance between metropolitan and non-
metropolitan populations. This has created urban centres with approximately 64 per 
cent of the Australian population living in the capital cities and more than 80 per cent 
living within 50 kilometres of the coastline. This has led to a distinct concentration of 
urban population growth (Advisor Panel 2010, Randolph 2006). 
This urban population growth, as well as continued real house price growth, has 
created visible changes in the types of metropolitan dwelling structures. This is 
evident with developers tapping a demand for smaller houses with increased housing 
diversity focused on community living. Around Australia, the trend is to smaller lot 
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sizes with higher density outcomes being encouraged by state governments (UDIA 
2013). 
In identifying the composition of the Australian housing market, specific locations 
within Australian capital cities can demonstrate distinct housing supply characteristics. 
Table 2: Examples of Melbourne dwelling structures 
Types 
Port Melbourne (Melbourne Inner) 
2001 2011 Difference 
Separate house 979 681 -30.4% 
Semi-detached, terrace house, 
townhouse etc. 
2,491 2,644 6.1% 
Flat, unit or apartment 1,340 3,191 138.1% 
    
Types 
Footscray (Melbourne Inner West) 
2001 2011 Difference 
Separate house 14,088 15,295 8.6% 
Semi-detached, terrace house, 
townhouse etc. 
2,155 3,622 68.1% 
Flat, unit or apartment 4,179 5,913 41.5% 
    
Types 
Werribee (Melbourne Outer West) 
2001 2011 Difference 
Separate house 9,812 11,159 13.7% 
Semi-detached, terrace house, 
townhouse etc. 
373 1,023 174.3% 
Flat, unit or apartment 985 1,023 3.9% 
Source: ABS Census 2001, 2011 
Table 2 illustrates the variation in metropolitan Melbourne’s housing supply over the 
past 10 years. This example shows that those locations near the Melbourne CBD 
have experienced strong apartment supply, while with those further from the CBD, the 
focus has been on separate and townhouse dwellings. These new outer suburbs 
comprise a mix of housing to attract families and first time home buyers offering 
attractive affordable housing options. 
The form of construction differs substantially across these dwelling types—low rise 
timber framed dwellings to high rise concrete apartments. Residential property 
developers and builders appear to concentrate on defined construction types (Burke 
2012). 
2.2 Residential property developers 
Dalton et al. (2013) recently provided a full description of the house building industry 
which delivered much more detail than the brief summary below. We recommend 
those readers wanting more information on the structure and operation of the house 
building industry refer to the Dalton work. 
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One way to analyse the structure of the Australian housing market is to examine those 
organisations that dominate new dwelling supply. Table 3 below lists the top 20 
organisations, ranked by their dwelling starts. 
Table 3: Largest Australian homebuilders and residential developers 2011–12 
 Organisations 
Detached 
housing 
Multi-unit 
housing 
Total 
1 Metricon Homes  2,821  2,821 
2 Alcock/Brown-Neaves Group  2,602 134 2,736 
3 BGC (Australia)  2,529 163 2,692 
4 Hickory Group Pty Ltd  2,163 2,163 
5 Simonds Group  1,917 122 2,039 
6 Brookfield Multiplex   1,938 1,938 
7 Henley Properties  1,698  1,698 
8 Hotondo Homes  719 744 1,463 
9 Porter Davis Homes  1,382  1,382 
10 GJ Gardner Homes  1,171  1,171 
11 Meriton Apartments  1,167 1,167 
12 Pindan Pty Ltd  135 987 1,122 
13 JWH Group  1,096  1,096 
14 Mirvac Group 519 567 1,086 
15 Dennis Family Homes  974  974 
16 JG King Pty Ltd  924 250 1,174 
17 Bloomer Constructions Pty Ltd  220 650 870 
18 Eden Brae Homes Pty Ltd  759 108 867 
19 Burbank Homes  632 234 866 
20 Summit Homes Group  721 136 857 
     
 Total 20,819 9,363 30,182 
Source: HIA 2012b 
Table 3 illustrates the distinct differences between Australia’s leading dwelling 
providers. In this sector, often a third party has purchased the land and the volume 
house builder (contract housing, project builder) constructs the residential property to 
a specified mass-produced design. A large number of firms on the list are project 
builders but some complete ‘speculative developments’ through house and land 
packages or apartments for perspective purchases. However, ‘speculative 
developments’ are less speculative in nature post GFC due to the requirement for pre-
sales (see below). 
For those project builders offering house and land packages, residential finance 
primarily relates to land purchase, infrastructure and holding costs because those 
contracting the dwelling, (the purchaser), are financing the construction. The 
specialised multi-unit house builders are commonly separate organisations from the 
developer and specialise in high rise apartment developments. Their financing 
requirements in general, cover separately the land and construction stages (Wilkinson 
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et al. 2008). There are very different financing issues for separate houses and 
apartment buildings because with houses, contract builders receive progress 
payments and hence do not carry the same financing load. With apartment buildings, 
funds are not released to the developer until the building is completed.3 
Predominately, the top 20 homebuilders and residential developers are private 
companies and appear to focus on defined residential property markets. For example, 
Metricon Homes’ operation is largely along the Australian eastern seaboard, whereas 
the Alcock/Brown-Neaves Group operation is concentrated in Western Australia (HIA 
2012b). 
According to HIA (2012b), there were approximately 30 000 housing starts for the top 
20 homebuilders and residential developers in 2011–12. This represented nearly 20 
per cent of total housing supply, but given there are over 40 000 building companies 
(Allen Consulting 2011) this is a significant proportion. The number of building 
companies suggests that the market is highly segmented with the larger players 
delivering high volume and thousands of smaller companies delivering a handful of 
units per annum. Geography and capacity are major influences on a company’s ability 
to deliver housing. 
Residential developers can be categorised by project completion end value: 
 Low value—less than $3 million: 
The vast majority of developers fit into this category. Often those operating on low 
value projects are part-time residential developers with their primary income 
sourced outside the property development industry. Projects are completed on an 
individual basis, before the next project starts. Limited knowledge and time 
constraints can restrict these property developers to small scale residential sub-
division work and medium density town houses. 
 Medium value—between $3 and $20 million: 
Generally, small scale property development companies operate in the medium 
value range. Local knowledge and trade connections are essential parts of the 
residential property developer handbook. Each development is treated separately, 
with viability and funding options reviewed at defined stages. As a ‘stand-alone’ 
entity, project finance is sourced with lending criteria depending on the project, 
developer and market conditions. 
 High value—above $20 million: 
Those large scale projects are generally managed by primarily local, but often 
national and more recently overseas, property development companies (being 
most evident in the Sydney and Melbourne CBD residential property markets). 
Joint ventures are common to lower the considerable specific property 
development risk. However, developers are typically reluctant to share profits with 
a third party, unless it is the way to secure a particular site or finance for a 
residential development (Wilkinson et al. 2008). 
Several of the leading property development companies have a recognised presence 
throughout the Australian property industry, both residential and commercial. Figure 2 
details leading Australian residential property developers. 
                                               
3
 Note that in some other countries progress payments are available for apartment developers. 
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Figure 2: Australian leading homebuilders and residential developers: December 2012 
 
Note: Investa Land is part of the Investa Property Group, which has a large commercial property portfolio. 
Adapted: AVJennings 2013. 
At the top of the ladder within Figure 2 are contract housing providers. Further down 
are the large property investment companies containing an extensive property 
development division, often providing specialist in-house services (e.g. acquisition, 
planning and construction management). 
The structure of residential development companies appears to vary with those in a 
defined residential development market operating as private entities compared to 
large publicly listed companies where residential property development competes with 
alternative property sectors for funding (e.g. commercial and retailing). The 
differences generally relate to business operations and financial structures. Private 
entities access debt capital on required bases while large public company balance 
sheets play an important part in covering debt funding arrangements (see 
Section 4.2). 
Generally, large public property companies own a portfolio of prime commercial 
properties. The structure of these companies (commonly unit trusts) permits them to 
have a diversified range of quality properties providing stable returns. To improve the 
performance, both commercial and residential development projects can add 
additional returns with limited financial risk. This is shown in Figure 3 below, which 
details the property strategy as at March 2012 for the AU$6.7 billion Mirvac Group, a 
publically listed Australian real estate investment trust, commonly referred to as an A-
REIT. 
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Figure 3: Mirvac Group strategy: March 2012 
 
Source: Mirvac Group 2012 
Figure 3 describes the balance between investment and development as well as the 
performance hurdles for the Investment and Development arms of the Mirvac Group. 
While the high quality commercial investment properties provide the basis for property 
company returns, the residential projects undertaken by the Mirvac Group 
development arm can offer higher returns and portfolio diversification. 
2.3 Residential property financiers 
Finance is a critical resource in the process of residential property development and 
an important element of the development feasibility assessment (see Section 3.2). 
The cost of finance depends on several factors, foremost among these is the level of 
risk that the property developer and lender are prepared to accept. Invariably this will 
depend on the level of security offered by the project and property developer 
(Brueggeman & Fisher 2008). 
The majority of residential property developments are undertaken using funding from 
an external third party source or sources. Financiers provide the difference between 
the developer’s available equity and the total cost of the project including all 
associated expenses. For example, in the most simplistic terms, if the developer had 
$1 million of their own money to invest in the project and the total cost to develop that 
project was $3 million, then that developer would need to seek finance to cover the 
$2 million gap. Financing is complex due to illiquidity, that is, funds are tied up in the 
development until it is sold, long development time spans meaning loans often need 
to be re-financed when they come to the end of their initial term and the large costs 
associated with residential developments (Wilkinson et al. 2008). 
There are two major stages in the development process that require funding—land 
purchase and the construction phase. These stages can be funded by a combination 
of equity and debt. Equity and debt reflect varying risks and, therefore, command 
varying investment returns (Brueggeman & Fisher 2008; Bryant 2012; Wilkinson et al. 
2008). 
By using debt rather than equity finance, the developer has a number of advantages, 
but also some disadvantages. The lender requires repayment of the debt and the 
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interest that was negotiated as part of the loan, but once the debt is repaid they have 
no further involvement in the project. The disadvantage is that if a developer is unable 
to pay back the loan, the funder may assume control of the project and do what they 
can to recover their funds as soon as possible, even if the longer term prospects for 
the project are good. An equity investor, on the other hand, has a stake in making 
sure that the project is profitable because they will get their money back as well as a 
share of the development profits. Hence, they are unlikely to prematurely close down 
a potentially successful project. On the other hand, because they do have a share of 
the project they may want a say in key project decisions, hence undermining the 
independence of the developer. 
When the property cycle is at its peak and banks have a strategy to maximise their 
exposure due to the perceived low risk associated with development, it has been 
possible to get 100 per cent debt finance, but this situation is rare. For example, 
currently the maximum debt finance level available from the major banks is about 
70 per cent. 
Figure 4: Residential development finance 
 
Source: Adapted: Bryant 2012 
Figure 4 details the funding sources for specific residential developments and projects 
may use one or more of these tranches. The tranches can be grouped into equity and 
debt sectors. The equity component is generally the cash consideration provided by 
the developer. The level of equity return is determined by the financial success of the 
development and is normally the last payment after all debt tranches are repaid 
(Wilkinson et al. 2008). When a developer provides equity to a project it increases 
their level of risk but also increases the potential return by reducing interest costs. 
Typically the debt tranches are in two parts, senior debt, which is the traditional form 
of funding, is provided by the major banks and their subsidiaries. The gap between 
senior debt, available equity and total development costs is covered by mezzanine 
debt which is most likely sourced from regional and foreign banks, mezzanine funds, 
investment banks and private equity. Typically, the credit risk appetite of lenders 
depends on a financial matrix alongside information on the property developer’s track 
record, the development itself, market conditions and overall funding availability 
(Bryant 2012). 
The mezzanine element of the debt tranches carries a higher default risk than senior 
debt because senior debt, as the term implies, has the first call on any revenue 
generated by the project. Therefore it is charged at a higher interest rate which, 
depending on capital market conditions, is usually 5–10 per cent higher than the rate 
of senior debt and is often available for a shorter time period. The higher interest rate 
reflects the level of risk associated with the possible project default and the potential 
inability of the property developer to pay the interest and return the capital. Given the 
higher cost of this funding, developers want to minimise their exposure to mezzanine 
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finance so these are often short term loans necessary to ‘plug a gap’ in project 
finances. 
For large scale residential property developments (major high rise apartment 
complexes etc.) finance can be beyond an individual bank’s lending limits. Capital 
market conditions generally dictate these limits, with finance over $100 million 
normally requiring banks to partner in order to provide the debt funding, thereby 
spreading the risk. These syndicated project loans provide the funding opportunity for 
major residential property developments. 
These large loans consisting of a group of financiers (banks) have a 'lead' bank, 
usually an established property lending bank with the necessary in-house expertise, 
which will arrange the syndicate. It is usual for the lead bank to have the final 
responsibility for making decisions on behalf of the syndicate during the loan period. 
Each bank shares, in proportion, the risk of the development depending on their initial 
considerations. This can lead to layers of requirements defined by the individual 
banks that can further complicate the financing arrangements (Wilkinson et al. 2008). 
2.4 Residential finance development risk 
There are a number of financial risks that can occur over the life of the property 
development project which includes pre-contract, building contract and post 
construction phases. Financial risks typically occur in the building contract and post 
construction phases and include: 
1. interest rate fluctuations 
2. project over-runs 
3. withdrawals of support by lenders 
4. incorrect forecasting of future values or cash flows. 
Source: Havard 2008 
The management of interest rates is important and can be achieved at the beginning 
of the loan with a variety of techniques that can include a fixed interest rate and a 
collar approach which provides a maximum and minimum level on the interest rates 
paid over the term of the loan. The attractiveness of the interest rate and the 
availability of funds need be considered, depending in part on the current financial 
environment (Ratcliffe et al. 2009). 
In managing interest rates, market conditions beyond the control of the developer can 
impact on the project. In many cases, these risks are magnified with the level of debt 
and timing issues. Risk mitigation can be achieved with sound assumptions within 
project appraisal at the initial finance stage of the residential property development 
process (Havard 2008). 
Likewise, project overruns can impact twice on the residential property developer. 
First, it affects cash flow and second, it increases costs. Procurement options can 
provide protection for the developer as liabilities for delays can be shifted to the 
building contractor. Property financiers do pay particular attention to the building 
contract as a way to mitigate the development risk and their own financial risk 
(Wilkinson et al. 2008). 
2.5 Property finance terms and measurements 
The section introduces some quantitative measures used in residential property 
finance that have yet to be defined. For residential property financiers, alongside 
descriptive measurements (e.g. a developer's track record, past relationship with the 
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bank, etc.), detailed financial appraisal is a key aspect of assessing the viability of a 
residential development and minimising risk. 
When assessing the risk of a loan, lenders will use a number of measures designed to 
quantify that risk through assessing the capacity of the borrower to service the loan. 
The most commonly understood measure, because it also applies to home purchase, 
is the loan to value ratio (LVR). This is the percentage of end development value that 
a lender is prepared to advance to a developer. The higher the loan to value ratio, the 
higher the risk to the lender. For example, if a project has an end value of $10 million, 
and the bank has an LVR limit of 80 per cent, then the maximum that will be lent is 
$8 million. This ratio offers protection against projects where end revenue outcomes 
are well below those expected. During the GFC, many lenders lowered their LVR from 
100 per cent to 70 per cent, this limited debt in the example to $7 million so requiring 
an additional $1 million equity, if the project has an end value of $10 million, to make 
the project work. 
In order to assess an LVR the lender needs to calculate the potential revenue from a 
development. This is achieved through determining the gross realisable value (GVR) 
and net realisable value (NVR). The GVR is the gross revenue from sales that a 
development could achieve. For example, if you have 20 units to sell at $500 000 
each, then your GRV would be $10 million. Importantly, where applicable, goods and 
service tax (GST) is deducted to achieve the GRV. NVR is the net value of sales, less 
the amount of GST (if applicable) paid on sales, less any selling costs (commissions 
paid to real estate agents for example). If you have 20 units to sell at $500 000 each, 
then your GRV would be $10 million, and if selling costs are 5 per cent, then the NRV 
is $9.5 million. 
Another way to quantify just how much a bank is prepared to lend is through the loan 
to cost ratio (LCR). This is the percentage of the development building cost (excluding 
developer profit) that a lender is prepared to advance to a developer. For example, if a 
project has an end value of $10 million, a building cost of $9 million and has an LCR 
limit of 80 per cent, then the maximum that will be lent is $7.2 million. This ratio 
protects the lender from an increase in building costs. If the LCR limit was lowered to 
70 per cent, then the maximum loan would be $6.3 million on the example above. 
When banks and developers are assessing the viability of development they will 
calculate the potential return from that development. There are a number of measures 
of return (also discussed in Section 3.2) which include the Internal Rate of Return 
(IRR), Equity IRR and developer’s margin. The IRR is the discount rate that produces 
a net present value (NPV) of zero. If the IRR is above the developer’s target rate of 
return, that is, the return the developer requires to compensate for the risk of 
undertaking the project, that project would be regarded as profitable. The IRR takes 
into consideration assumptions on the effect of time, incomes, costs, end 
development value and a discount rate. 
The equity IRR is used when a project is funded using a mix of equity and debt and 
the investor would like to estimate the rate of return on equity, after debt costs and 
payments are removed. Hence equity IRR is essentially the leveraged version of the 
project IRR. If the project is 100 per cent debt funded, then no equity IRR will exist. 
Where the project IRR is greater than the cost of finance, the equity IRR will exceed 
the project IRR. Where the project IRR is less than the cost of finance, the equity IRR 
will be less than the project IRR. 
Other factors taken into account when assessing the potential of a development 
include the structure of the development company and the type of loan facility itself. 
Special purpose vehicles (SPVs) are commonly used by developers to separate 
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projects in separate entities, providing a logical structure for legal and financial 
purposes. This ‘stand-alone’ entity provides the structure for agreements and 
contracts between lenders, developers and other interested parties and is the 
arrangement for financial payments. In contrast to the SPV is the multi option facility 
(MOF) which consists of an overall debt limit that may be made up of a number of 
assets. The MOF offers a degree of flexibility above that received for a single asset 
debt facility. The benefit of having an MOF is there in no need to renegotiate the 
contact each time you sell/acquire an asset. This provides major property 
organisations with access to an investment and development portfolio across a range 
of assets and a range of risk profiles (Rowland 2010). 
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3 RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY FINANCE—PROCESS, 
PROFIT AND PRE-SALES 
This chapter explores the importance of property finance within the residential 
development process. It discusses how finance fits into the process and how it affects 
development profitability. For example, the cost of finance and other loan covenants 
can have an impact on project viability and a project with marginal viability on 
traditional lending terms could be pushed into the non-viable category by an increase 
in the interest rate required by the lender. The chapter also examines the issue of pre-
sales which were identified as one of the key blockages to certain types of 
development in the current market. 
This chapter starts by examining the place of finance in the development process 
before examining the current availability of finance. It then goes on to explore how 
finance and lending covenants can affect project viability through the use of feasibility 
modelling. 
3.1 Finance and the development process 
Gurran et al. (2012), identify the major elements of the housing delivery system in 
Australia (see Figure 5 below). While there has been a lot of public comment about 
the barriers generated by urban planning regulation on housing supply, recent 
industry reports (see Chapter 4 for examples) identify the difficulties of accessing 
residential finance as the major barrier to dwelling production in Australia. In the 
words of one of the developers interviewed in the study, project funding is the critical 
issue in project delivery. 
Development is all about funding, it is a very capital intensive business so the 
first thing, the middle thing and the last thing and everywhere in between, 
every question, every thought of mine is about the impact of funding. So it is a 
major impact on the business. There is really only two key things I think when 
we are looking at a project: What is the market for the product and how is it 
going to be funded? Those two things never really leave us, the design and 
the funding implications, design in the market and funding implications 
because whether you are Mirvac [large national developer] or Morgate [small 
local developer], the ability to fund projects is critical to the success of the 
project. (NSW Developer) 
Finance forms the critical stage in the development process because without it the 
project can go no further; the developer cannot purchase the land or secure the funds 
necessary to pay for construction and all other associated expenses. A developer 
must therefore be confident that a source of funds will be available before expending 
too much of their own money on assessing a development project or securing a 
lengthy and costly development approval. 
The planning system itself can create conditions that are not conducive to profitable 
development and can add an element of uncertainty and risk to the development 
process. This uncertainty may be the deciding factor in determining whether a bank 
decides to lend on a development scheme. The development approval process is 
considered to be a major blockage for schemes that have gone through the initial 
stages of the development process, that is, have been considered feasible and the 
developer is proceeding to the construction phase. However, the vast majority of 
developments will not make it to that stage because they are not considered feasible 
or the developer cannot secure finance. So, while the planning system is an easy and 
visible target to blame for housing supply blockages, the main factors preventing 
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supply come much earlier in the form of a lack of return for the given risk or a bank’s 
unwillingness to lend to a particular developer or on a particular scheme. 
Figure 5: The Australian housing supply system—Factors impacting on new supply 
 
Source: Gurran N et al. 2012 
Finance in a development scheme has traditionally been positioned towards the 
middle of what is traditionally assumed to be a fairly linear development process 
(Havard 2008; Wilkinson et al. 2008). Figure 6 below shows the stages in a typical 
linear development process (Rowley & Phibbs 2012) illustrating a situation where the 
land is purchased and development approvals obtained before finance is secured 
from a lender. Within such a process land would be purchased using the developer’s 
own equity, through a land syndicate, a joint venture, or perhaps through an option 
(see Section 5.1). In each case, the process effectively assumes that finance is taken 
as a given because the time and money spent getting through the design and 
development approval process would be significant and developers would not take on 
that risk without a guarantee that funding would be available when required. Therefore 
these two development processes assume a stable and secure flow of finance, 
perhaps through a corporate facility or line of credit, for example. This brings us to an 
important distinction between different types of developers and the availability of credit 
(dealt with in more detail in Section 4.2). 
Organisational structure has a huge impact on the developer’s ability to access 
finance with the larger, national developers relying on corporate facilities rather than 
project specific finance secured on the project itself. With such a facility, finance is 
more secure and accessible, therefore the traditional position of finance in the process 
is maintained. However, for many developers without a largely guaranteed source of 
funds, the process is rather different from that illustrated in Figure 6. Figure 7 provides 
a more complex illustration of the role finance plays affecting numerous stages of the 
process. Without some certainty in the availability and cost of finance it is very difficult 
for a developer to proceed past initial project assessment. Finance will not only 
influence how and when the developer secures access to the site but will also affect 
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viability and determine when the project must be marketed if pre-sales are a 
requirement. 
Figure 6: Standard linear development process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Rowley and Phibbs 2012 
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Figure 7: The role of finance in the development process 
 
Source: Authors  
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3.1.1 Site acquisition 
Interviews conducted during the research suggest that site acquisition is far more 
complex than standard development textbooks report. There are a number of ways 
developers will access sites for development. These include: 
 Purchasing the land with equity, debt or some combination. 
 Securing on option over the land. 
 Undertaking a joint venture with the landowner. 
 Land syndication. 
Traditionally land would be purchased up front, ideally using the developer’s own 
equity to avoid finance costs payable over the life of the development, which could be 
many years. The trouble with using the developer’s equity is that equity is tied up in 
that development site until the project is completed and sold. Some developers will 
purchase land upfront and try to generate profits through the uplift in value resulting 
from development approval and the land can then be used as the security for the 
finance: 
At the start of the project, the developer will hold a preliminary meeting with 
the Bank of Queensland re the finance potential for the site. Recent example, 
they [a developer] purchased a site for $500 000. After the DA was approved 
the site was valued at $1 million. The bank were happy to lend 50 per cent of 
the new valuation so they [the developer] got their $500 000 'back'. So they 
[the developer] look for sites with planning uplift so they can maximise their 
leverage. (Development Financier) 
Developers who purchase land upfront, secure the development approval and then 
approach banks for finance risk finding that finance is not available. In such a case 
they will need to dispose of the land which may result in a significant loss depending 
on the state of the market and whether the approval holds any value, that is, is 
attractive to other developers. Other developers may base their entire business on 
purchasing land, securing development approval and then on-selling land. Such 
organisations make their money through knowing how to navigate the development 
approval process. 
If there is a gap between the land cost and available developer equity then the 
developer will either seek debt funding; source equity from other investors, high net 
wealth individuals for example, or perhaps establish a land syndicate where investors 
are offered the opportunity to share in land ownership and development (see 
Section 5.1 for more details). 
Securing an option over the land is another possibility where an agreement is reached 
with the landowner enabling land purchase to be negotiated subject to development 
approval; the eventual price dependent on a number of factors, for example, the 
profitability of the development. However, an option may prove difficult when the 
landowner is in a strong bargaining position, but such a structure does reduce risk for 
the developer: 
Smaller developers will often just get the DA approved through an option and 
then just hope they can get finance. Often this proves difficult and they have to 
sell the site, often with little profit. (Development Financier) 
The preferred option for many developers in a period where finance is tight is to 
establish a joint venture with a landowner where there might be a profit sharing 
arrangement in return for the landowner contributing the land. This removes the cost 
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of purchasing land upfront and the holding costs associated with land (land tax, 
opportunity cost of capital etc.), which are considerable according to the Residential 
Development Council and Urban Development Institute of Australia (UDIA) (see 
Gurran et al. 2009). Not only do joint ventures allow the developer to share the costs 
of the development approval process they also reduce risk significantly if approval is 
not granted or the scheme turns out not to be profitable by the time approval is 
finalised. 
You try to as much as possible have joint ventures with landowners because 
holding on to big slabs of land is very difficult because some of it you won’t 
develop for 20 years and it just sits on your balance sheet. If they [landowners] 
want the value for the land that they thought they might have in 2005 they 
have to start sharing the risk and I don’t think you’ll see people buying 20 
years supply of land that you might have seen in other generations. 
(Greenfield developer, WA) 
A joint venture partner brings the site to us and the site is how they buy their 
way in. We don’t buy the site off the JV partner. The site is valued and then we 
would tip in, depending upon the size of the site but a ballpark figure, 50 per 
cent of project costs to get everything started, and during that time we will go 
to the banks and the market and one of them [banks] will put a figure to us 
which looks attractive and we can make it work. (High density developer, WA) 
One of the main advantages of a joint venture is removing the need for upfront equity 
which is very expensive and means that equity can then be spread over a number of 
projects. 
We also do projects where we do buy the land and we will talk to the bank at 
that stage, but the majority of our developments are done with joint venture 
partners which allow us to carry on a number of projects at any one time. (High 
density developer, WA) 
Joint ventures with state and local government are also a way of spreading risk and 
allowing access to land that may not otherwise be available. (Rowley & Phibbs 2012, 
Section 4.2.6) 
The position of finance in the development process therefore depends largely on the 
structure of the land deal. Joint ventures often allow finance to be secured at a later 
date with the traditional equity land purchase less viable post GFC given a reduction 
in the availability of finance (see Chapter 4). The risk of purchasing land, being unable 
to finance and then being left with an asset that cannot be sold is too great for smaller 
developers: 
Pre GFC we would find the site, buy it, and then find the finance, but now we 
never buy anything without having the finance in place. (Infill developer, WA) 
3.2 Impact of finance on development viability 
There have been a number of studies examining the impact of various variables on 
development viability such as construction costs (NHSC 2010, UDIA 2011), 
development contributions (Gurran et al. 2009), and delays in planning approval 
(Rowley & Phibbs 2012), but nothing on the impact of finance. Although finance does 
not have as significant an impact on overall feasibility as, for example, government 
taxes, levies and compliance costs, which Gurran et al. (2009) estimated to account 
for around a third of the cost of a new house and land package, changes to the cost of 
debt could mean the difference between a profitable project and one that does not 
proceed. Of course, the vast majority of projects require debt funding to get off the 
ground so this analysis assumes that finance is available in the first place, but the 
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cost, and therefore the impact, of finance varies depending on the various loan 
covenants imposed. 
Development feasibility is typically assessed via feasibility models such as 
Estatemaster’s Development Feasibility software. Variables are entered into the 
model which include information on costs and revenues and finance details such as 
the level of equity, structure and term of the loan and interest rate. Such models then 
provide an outcome in terms of a number of development profitability measures, 
including developer's profit, internal rate of return and return on equity. 
Table 4 below provides a simple example describing the feasibility assessment of a 
medium sized apartment development with a development period of around three 
years from site acquisition, through development approval, construction and then 
disposal. The table begins with the total revenue predicted from the sale of the 
apartments, less selling and marking costs and GST payable on revenue. In this 
simple example, the developer uses their own equity ($12.5 million) to purchase the 
land therefore minimising the amount of debt funding required upfront. The cost of 
actually constructing the development is $32 million and added to those physical 
construction costs are professional fees (architect, quantity surveyor, planning 
consultants, etc.) and statutory charges such as a development approval lodgement 
fee and developer contributions (depending upon the state). Most projects will include 
a contingency sum to cover any unexpected costs and there will also be land holding 
costs consisting of land tax and perhaps strata levies for unsold apartments. 
Finally there is the cost of finance. In this example it is assumed the developer has 
already approached the bank and the bank has agreed to provide the developer 
access to a line of credit, although there is an initial loan establishment fee of 
$500 000 and additional line fees of $133 000, at an interest rate of 6 per cent. Funds 
will be drawn down from the loan when required to fund various aspects of the 
development. In this case the peak debt exposure is $39.3 million with total interest 
expenses of $2.5 million. As soon as the revenue starts to come in from sales, the 
developer will use the funds to pay down the debt until it is eventually paid off and any 
remaining revenues are taken as profit. In this example the difference between the 
total revenue and total costs is $13.2 million which is the net development profit. 
  
  28 
Table 4: Development feasibility outcome 
Total revenue (after GST paid) 
 
$63,850,651 
Construction costs $32,036,736  
Land costs $12,500,000  
Pre-sales commissions $654,432  
Project contingency $1,784,828  
Professional and statutory fees $3,766,500  
Land holding costs $448,733  
Interest expenses $2,547,798  
Finance charges (inc. fees) $633,334  
Total costs (after GST reclaimed) 
 
$50,584,385 
Net development profit 
 
$13,266,267 
Development margin (profit/risk margin)  24.2% 
Equity IRR  26.3% 
Project IRR  14.7% 
Source: Feasibility calculated using Estatemaster Development Feasibility software. 
Development profitability can be measured in a number of ways. The most simplistic 
is the development margin which is net development profit as a percentage of total 
development costs. Many developers would use this as an early indicator of whether a 
project is likely to be feasible and, depending on the state of the market, the 
development sector and risk involved in the project, an acceptable minimum margin 
may range from 10 per cent to 25 per cent. In Table 4 the development margin is 
24 per cent, but this needs to be considered alongside the risk taken by the 
developer; in this project the main risk being the large equity contribution for land 
purchase. 
The second measure of profitability is the return the developer can generate from the 
equity they invest in the project. The equity Internal Rate of Return (IRR) shows the 
annualised return on the $12.5 million investment given the cash flows from the 
development. The required return on equity will depend upon the individual developer 
and the potential return from other investments of comparable risk. The developer 
would need to decide whether 26 per cent is acceptable given alternative investment 
opportunities. 
The IRR on a project is a third measure of profitability which allows a comparison of 
overall project returns with the developer’s target rate of return, which again is based 
on the requirements of the individual developer and the market/property specific risks 
of the development. If the developer’s project target rate of return was 14 per cent and 
target equity IRR, say, 25 per cent, then this would be considered a potentially viable 
development opportunity and would proceed to the next phase of the development 
process. 
Anything that affects the revenue or costs of development will affect the development 
profit outcomes. Therefore policy decisions that affect what a developer can and 
cannot build will impact directly upon the potential revenue and profit. Policies on 
zoning, densities, height, infrastructure and developer contributions, for example, will 
all affect development profitability and are key determinants of whether a project will 
proceed to completion. Finance is an element of costs that can have a significant 
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impact on development profitability. The analysis below can equally be applied to 
assess the impact on profit of other variables. 
Table 5 below demonstrates how a higher interest rate results in a lower return on all 
measures of profitability because overall net profits fall due to rising development 
costs. The table is based on the development scenario discussed above and the only 
variable altered is the interest rate of the loan, ranging from 6 per cent through to 
10 per cent. With an interest rate on the loan of 8 per cent, finance costs constitute 
7 per cent of total development costs or almost $3.5 million. An increase of 2 per cent 
in the interest rate on the loan will affect total development costs through increasing 
the interest charged. In this case 2 per cent equates to roughly $1 million in additional 
interest which has a significant impact on the developer’s margin. The lower the 
interest rate charged on the loan the greater the development profitability, if all other 
variables are held constant. In this particular scenario any interest rate on the loan 
above 6 per cent would mean that the project is not viable if the required project IRR 
is 14.5 per cent or equity IRR 26 per cent. 
Table 5: Impact of lending rates on development profitability 
 Developer purchases land with equity, remaining 
costs debt funded 
Interest rate 6% 8% 10% 
Total revenue (after GST) $63,850,651 $63,850,651 $63,850,651 
Total development costs $50,584,385 $51,479,342 $52,398,292 
Peak debt exposure $39,363,470 $40,184,436 $41,026,483 
Interest charged $2,547,798 $3,442,755 $4,361,705 
Finance costs as % of 
development costs 
5% 7% 8% 
Loan to value ratio* 52.6% 53.7% 54.8% 
Equity IRR 26.3% 24.9% 23.5% 
Development margin 24.2% 22.2% 20.2% 
Project IRR 14.7% 13.7% 12.8% 
Note: *Loan to Value ratio is the Peak Equity/Debt Exposure divided by Total Sales Revenue on the 
senior debt. 
In Table 6 below the analysis models four different loan structures with varying loan to 
value ratios dependent on the level of equity the developer is able to invest. In the first 
example (a) the developer only has $2 million in equity which means that the 
remaining costs have to be debt funded. Increased debt has a negative impact on the 
development margin and project IRR because of the increased cost of finance. 
However, the developer’s return on equity increases significantly. If this measure of 
return is the one upon which the developer is basing their development strategy then 
the project may well proceed if the bank is willing to lend on those terms. 
If the developer contributed $6 million in equity, example (b), this will increase the 
project IRR and developer margin over example (a) by reducing the proportion of total 
costs allocated to finance but the return on equity will fall, although will remain much 
higher than if they developer contributed the full $12.5 million land value as per 
Table 4. 
If the bank were only prepared to accept a loan to value ratio of around 50 per cent, 
and the developer only had $6 million equity to contribute, example (c), they may be 
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forced to plug the gap with mezzanine finance which is considerably more expensive. 
In this case finance rises to 12 per cent of total costs and the project IRR drops to 
10 per cent although the equity IRR remains above 30 per cent. 
Finally example (d) presents a scenario where a joint venture between the landowner 
and developer sees the landowner contributing the land and developer injecting 
$6 million in equity. The development margin rises to 27.9 per cent although there 
would need to be some sort of profit sharing arrangement with the landowner, but the 
risk for the developer is reduced considerably meaning they can accept a lower level 
of return. The project IRR also rises significantly with a healthy equity return, well 
above the original scenario where the developer invests the full $12.5 million. The 
joint venture minimises the debt exposure and interest charged, significantly reducing 
the risk for the lender and finance costs as a proportion of total costs. In a market 
where credit is tight, this sort of arrangement would be attractive to a lending 
institution. 
Table 6: Impact of equity contributions on development profitability 
 
(a) $2 million 
equity, 
remainder debt 
funded 
(b) $6 million 
equity, 
remainder 
debt funded 
(c) $6 million equity, 
$6.5 million 
mezzanine, 
remainder senior 
debt funded 
(d) Joint 
Venture. $6 
million equity 
from developer 
and land from 
landowner 
Interest rate 8% 8% 8% / 15% 8% 
Peak debt exposure $53,091,183 $48,176,264 $49,737,866 $33,146,053 
Interest charged $5,931,381 $4,983,696 $6,615,603 $2,393,601 
Total development 
costs 
$53,972,134 $53,024,449 $54,652,189 $ 50,388,521 
Finance costs as 
percentage of 
development costs 
11% 9% 12% 5% 
Loan to value ratio 70.9% 64.3% 53% 44% 
Equity IRR 62.6% 36.8% 32.9% 42.5% 
Development margin 17.0% 18.9% 15.6% 27.9% 
Project IRR 10.9% 11.9% 10.3% 15% 
Finally, Table 7 illustrates the impact of a six-month delay in the development process 
on profitability on example (b) above. The main impact is on the $6.5 million borrowed 
to fund the land purchase (to plug the gap between the developer’s $6 million equity 
and the $12.5 million land price). Interest is paid on this $6.5 million for an extra six 
months and the overall effect is an increase of $0.5 million which has a significant 
impact on the three measures of profitability, potentially pushing the project into the 
unviable category. Such a delay could force a developer to pull out of the scheme if 
profit is marginal. 
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Table 7: Impact of a six-month DA delay on finance costs 
 $6 million equity, 
remainder debt funded 
$6 million equity, remainder debt 
funded. Six-month delay in DA 
Interest rate 8% 8% 
Interest charged $4,983,696 $5,491,165 
Total development costs $53,024,449 $54,128,375 
Finance costs as percentage 
of development costs 
9% 10% 
Equity IRR 36.8% 29.54% 
Development margin 18.9% 17.1% 
Project IRR 11.9% 9.9% 
The examples above demonstrate how finance can determine whether development 
proceeds and delivers housing. If the project does not fit the bank’s lending strategy, 
is considered too high risk due to the track record of the developer, or the developer 
cannot contribute sufficient equity and/or secure the necessary pre-sales, then finance 
will not be available. If the scheme does 'stack up' for the bank, the cost of finance 
could mean it is not viable from the developer’s perspective. 
3.3 Pre-sales requirements 
The lending covenant that generated the biggest reaction from developer interviewees 
was that of pre-sales. Pre-sales refer to the requirement to sell a certain proportion of 
the development, be it lots, houses or apartments, before the construction phase of 
the development. Pre-sales demonstrates there is a market for the product and also 
guarantees a certain level of revenue before the loan begins. Banks usually require a 
10 per cent down-payment on the lot or dwelling with the purchaser signing a contract 
to complete the purchase when the title of the property is finalised. Such pre-sales 
avoid a situation where the developer is unable to sell the development and pay off 
the debt. 
We aim for 50 per cent pre-sales on a project which is usually enough to pay 
out the builder and refund the bank. Beyond that we recover our costs and the 
profit. If you can't get to 50 per cent then maybe your product is not right or the 
pricing is not right. There are very few people in the industry that go 'this is fine 
I will build it and still sell it at the end'. (Infill developer) 
During the GFC, lenders required 100–110 per cent of debt covered by pre-sales, for 
example the debt is $10 million and the developer is required to secure pre-sales of 
20 apartments with a completion price of $500 000 each. The level of pre-sales 
required will vary depending on the type of scheme and the perceived risk to the 
lender. However, the requirement for pre-sales presents challenges for the developer: 
If banks want 100 per cent of debt covered by pre-sales that is tough 
especially for the small players because it will take them longer to get the 
project off the ground and the interest, all the holding costs will be greater. 
(High density developer) 
Banks are requiring us to get 50 per cent presales before we start. We need to 
go out and get sales at aggressive prices early to make it work. In the past we 
have done this through a display village but this is getting harder. Sometimes 
we need to bring in a wealthy individual stakeholder to pick up the necessary 
level of presales at a discounted price. (Greenfield developer) 
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The structure of pre-sales themselves is also problematic, particularly when 
developments are aimed at a particular section of the market, for example the 
affordable end and first-time buyers. 
X [one of the big four banks] never asked us for pre-sales before because we 
always sold everything quickly. Post GFC, a current project requires 70 per 
cent of [loan] value in pre-sales. $10 million loan so $7 million in pre-sales. Not 
a big issue getting the numbers, but it is the condition of the pre-sales. Banks 
want 10 per cent deposit and it is OK if you are selling to people that have the 
deposit but in the whole history of the company only 5 per cent of clients have 
ever had a 10 per cent deposit. This is the issue now because the banks want 
pre-sales but the 10 per cent deposit in the affordable market is not possible, 
so we need pre-sales from the investor market where historically we have sold 
50:50. This requirement has a big impact on the affordable market. (Infill 
developer) 
It is a double problem because it is the problem of obtaining finance on the 
development capital side and then the problem of purchasers getting finance 
on the retail side and the two of those play into each other and in some cases 
they are the same bank. (Greenfield developer) 
The difficulty is you are trying to sell six to nine months from title and the 
finance approvals people get do not last that long. So even if you have pre-
sales, they will be conditional and so meaningless in a strict legal sense. The 
banks are asking for a deposit which they can’t afford so we only ask $2000. 
(Greenfield developer) 
Again the impact of pre-sales depends on the type of developer and type of project. In 
a strong market, particularly with apartments where overseas investors can make a 
big dent in the required level of pre-sales, the covenant is not a major issue. Where it 
becomes an issue is for the unproven developer who has to pre-sell 80–100 per cent 
of the development in order for the bank to lend. This involves considerable risk and 
up-front costs which many developers are unable to assume. Selling lots at the 
affordable end of the market with a 10 per cent deposit requirement rules out many 
first-time buyers lacking the 10 per cent and, as stated above, finance approvals do 
not last long enough to cover the development period. 
Pre-sales can often take the form of display villages, but in areas where there is 
significant redevelopment every developer has the same idea: 
… to get started on the 1500 lots with stage 1, 41 lots, and the bank required 
us to get 50 per cent pre-sales before we could start. We had to get 20 sales 
at aggressive prices to make it work. We tried to get a display village which 
would count as pre-sales, but every developer in WA was doing the same, but 
the builders had had enough and we had 250 display homes north of Perth. 
Instead we had to bring in a wealthy stakeholder who entered into an option 
for 20 lots that said if we were getting to settlement and hadn’t had 20 sales he 
would pick up the remainder at a discounted price. Once we got that, the bank 
allowed us to progress. (Greenfield developer) 
Pre-sales can also delay development which could push the developer into the wrong 
part of the cycle. 
Finance has never been an issue where we have thought we can’t do that 
project but we have had to achieve a certain level of pre-sales. It meant that 
project had to wait another three or four or six months before we achieved that 
target and things can begin. 
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Pre-sales are therefore very important and particularly difficult for the smaller 
developer who cannot afford the expense or take on the risk necessary to extensively 
market a development at an early stage just to satisfy the bank. The covenant is an 
impediment to supply for many small and medium developers and a barrier to market 
entry for any new developer. 
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4 AVAILABILITY OF FINANCE 
Using medium household growth projections and assuming historic demand and 
supply trends continue, National Housing Supply Council (NHSC 2012) projections 
indicate that at least 160 000 new dwellings per annum will be required to meet 
growth in household numbers. Currently annual completions are a long way behind 
this target. The first part of this chapter identifies the availability of finance as a key 
barrier to housing supply. It reviews a range of industry documents that identify 
access to residential finance as one of the reasons why housing completions have 
been so low when compared to underlying demand. The second part of this chapter 
explores, through the developer interviews and other material, the impact of the GFC 
on the availability of finance before concluding with an assessment of how a 
developer’s organisational structure is one of the critical elements governing access to 
funds. 
The Allen Consultancy Group (2011) prepared a report on the ‘credit freeze’ for the 
Residential Development Council of the Property Council of Australia. They 
highlighted that the GFC 'knocked out key providers of debt capital' and there is now 
'less use of debt finance and greater uses of internal sources of finance'. This 
statement is reinforced by Broadbent (2009) who stated 'leverage has been declining, 
with bank intermediate debt being replaced by record raisings of equity'. 
The Allen report highlighted the major reason behind a reduction in the availability of 
finance: 
The property market became, or was at least perceived to have become, a 
riskier market. Lower prices and defaults in residential and commercial 
property loans resulted in properties being considered riskier than other 
assets. This in turn reduced banks’ appetite for new property loans and 
required banks to manage existing exposures as opposed to writing new 
facilities. That is, banks had to shift their focus from issuing new loans to 
managing existing delinquent loans (Allen Consulting 2011, p.8). 
A recent NAB Residential property survey (NAB 2013) identified tight credit conditions 
as the most significant constraint for new housing development. The Housing Industry 
Association concurred, writing: 
… the wider issue of tighter credit supply post the GFC manifests itself in 
commercially viable residential projects failing to obtain the finance to get off 
the ground. This is now a very large supply side constraint amongst a plethora 
of longer running constraints which have been building up for 20 years now. 
Tighter credit conditions for households also play a constraining role, but the 
key breakdown occurs on the development (supply) side (HIA 2012a). 
The Master Building Association’s (MBA) national survey highlights the issue of 
finance. In the MBA's September survey of 2009, 32.4 per cent of respondents were 
concerned that availability of finance was having a large/major constraining effect on 
their businesses. This was up significantly on survey results from 2007. In their most 
recent survey, June 2013, 22.6 per cent of respondents were still concerned that as a 
constraint, availability of finance was having a major/large effect on their business 
(MBA 2009, 2013). 
The UDIA publish an annual state of land report. Reports from 2011, 2012 and 2013 
produced the following information: 
A substantial issue is that smaller developers have exited the market due to 
difficulties in obtaining finance. The difficulties of obtaining finance are being 
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adapted to, with higher costs being built into feasibility. This has meant many 
projects have been shelved or those which have gone ahead require little or 
no value to be given to the raw land. (Queensland 2011) 
The slowdown in production is a result of delays in the approvals process and 
the difficulty the development industry has with securing lending finance to 
complete projects or to bring new projects on stream. There is real concern in 
the industry that banks are limiting their exposure to property by introducing 
'caps' which will affect the viability of some projects. (Western Australia 2011) 
Despite some improvement in 2010/11, accessing developer finance remains 
a significant barrier, with high pre-sales requirements and low loan to value 
ratios impacting on infill development in particular. (Queensland 2012) 
… several prevailing issues, such as the difficulty in securing finance and the 
overlay of federal environmental approvals, could jeopardise future land 
supply. (Western Australia 2012) 
The difficulty of the cautious market, the banks’ tight lending policies … means 
that the delivery of developed land to the market place—from identification of 
suitable land to completed works ready for dwelling construction—is slow. 
(South Australia 2012) 
Accessing developer finance, particularly for small and medium-sized 
developers remains a significant barrier, with high pre-sales requirements, low 
loan-to-value ratios and overly conservative valuations impacting on 
development activity. (Brisbane 2013) 
There has been a steady decline in number of lots produced per annum since 
the peak of 2005/06 and with continued restrictions on access to finance, the 
industry is providing lots for immediate demand rather than adding to stock 
numbers. Industry is fearful that it might not be able to respond to sudden 
increased demand. (Perth 2013) 
Interestingly the finance quotes were restricted to Western Australia, Queensland and 
South Australia with other states seemingly viewing finance as less of a constraint or 
simply not reporting on the issue. 
The National Housing Supply Council’s 2011 State of Supply report noted a wide 
range of factors impacting on land supply including 'the challenge, particularly for 
smaller players, to raise finance'. It also stated: 
The building industry has also had to face up to a weaker market, and the 
volume of property being built has fallen significantly. Approvals for building 
dwellings other than detached houses (largely multi-unit apartment buildings) 
saw a longer downturn than those for building houses following the global 
financial crisis. The Council believes that this is partly due to more limited 
access to development finance for this form of development subsequent to the 
GFC and in the light of market conditions. (NHSC 2011) 
The recent availability of finance and the role of the major four banks can be seen 
through the analysis of Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) data. The 
APRA data (APRA 2013) shows how commercial bank lending by the major banks 
(Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited, Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia, the National Australia Bank Limited, Westpac Banking Corporation and their 
subsidiary banks) on land development, subdivision and other residential projects 
grew rapidly up to a peak around October 2008 and has since fallen back to mid-2007 
levels and the trend remained downwards to May 2013 (Figure 8). Figure 9 below 
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illustrates how there were numerous sources of finance outside the major banks up 
until mid-2008 at which point there was a dramatic shift in the proportion of 
commercial lending attributable to the major banks, demonstrating the significant 
withdrawal of alternative sources of finance. A similar shift is evident in the retail 
mortgage sector with lending via major banks increasing by almost 10 per cent in a 
very short period towards the end of 2008 (Figure 10). In stark contrast to commercial 
lending (Figure 8), bank lending on residential terms loans continued to grow steadily 
post GFC. 
Figure 8: Commercial property exposure of major banks 
 
Figure 9: Proportion of commercial property lending provided by major banks 
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Figure 10: Residential term loans to households: Major banks 
 
Interviews with developers and financiers offered a number of insights into the current 
availability of finance. Many expressed views that the finance environment was tough 
but if the project 'stacked up' and the developer had a track record and could meet the 
loan covenants imposed by the bank, funding would flow. 
If the project’s fundamentals are rock solid and the demand is very clear and it 
is a big company like us you won’t have a problem at all getting finance. 
(Greenfield developer) 
If the project stacks up, it is in the right place, right design, managed by the 
right people, for the right people there is no problem getting the money 
together to do it. I don’t think it is any different now than it was then except for 
pre-sales. (Small developer) 
Concerns were expressed that traditional lending practices, where relationships are 
established with banks at the local level, had disappeared and decisions were being 
centralised to the detriment of lending practices: 
Decisions are made by credit departments over East that have probably never 
been to Perth. The local people here are just post offices that collect 
information for them. Years ago you would have had quite competent senior 
property people and they understood your business. They now have no 
decision-making powers. (Greenfield developer) 
In addition, some interviewees thought decision making lacked flexibility, being 
determined by the strategy of the bank in terms of their overall exposure to property, a 
given location, and a specific type of residential development rather than the strength 
of the project itself. 
We had a very strong relationship with [a major bank] and did a lot of projects 
with them, all successful, but six months ago they stopped and the latest 
projects we have had to go to other lenders. We finished projects with [the 
major bank] and new projects are going to new lenders. They don’t want to do 
residential development any more and direction comes down from the top. 
They … provide terms that are unacceptable. (Infill developer) 
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… they [banks] take no account of markets and they are comparing their 
lending policies with simply how they feel they should be weighted overall in 
various sectors. (Greenfield developer) 
If lenders view a particular location as high risk they will avoid funding at all in that 
location: 
We currently have a project in regional New South Wales and a number of the 
banks were burnt in regional New South Wales so they are not returning to 
regional New South Wales, so we have had to look for other funding solutions 
which involve larger equity. (National developer) 
They [the banks] are now steering away from regional areas because they are 
very difficult to finance. (Greenfield developer) 
Many lenders have tried to reduce their exposure to specific sectors of the property 
market making it difficult for developers operating in those particular areas to obtain 
funding. However, there were many contradictory views surrounding the current 
availability of finance. Some interviewees thought the availability of finance had not 
improved post GFC due to the lending practices of banks: 
We bank with [two major banks]. The assumptions they are making now are a 
bit more cautious and they flow through the management systems they have 
got and it means they are less free flowing with the cash. (High density 
developer) 
The banks go through internal processes so at the moment [major bank] has 
gone off the ball and the way they treat finance is not something that works for 
us. I wouldn’t be surprised that in two years a lot of our business is with [the 
same major bank] because may be they will look at their loan book and want 
to put in for a couple of projects which will be their coverage. Their 
conservatism has been to the detriment of other developers. (Greenfield 
developer) 
Things are very difficult. The major banks have a lot of problem loans which 
they are trying to work through (rather than send into receivership) so we 
cannot see much reason for an improvement until this situation is resolved. 
(Development financier) 
Post GFC it has been extraordinarily difficult for greenfield developers. We are 
in the top three by size of greenfield developers and are highly regarded so 
probably have less difficulty than a lot of people out there. When [a major bank 
subsidiary] came back into lending they were only lending to four companies 
including us, I think they are looking to expand that now, but generally very 
difficult. (National greenfield developer) 
The prospects look very much the same into the future. There is no light. 
Banks risk appetite seems to have got worse. Things won’t change until they 
clear their bad debts. The second tier banks are struggling to get access to 
finance at the right price so they aren’t going to be much help. (Small 
developer) 
Other interviewees thought the availability of finance was improving: 
We are finding now that banks are starting to get back into the game. They 
helped create this land shortage and in the last two to three months they are 
expressing an interest. They are seeing that they are underweight in terms of 
their guidelines …. I think the funding one will fix itself; the banks have done 
enough damage now. (Greenfield developer) 
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Yes, there appears to be more funding available, however it remains project 
specific so it is not necessarily more readily available across the board. (UDIA 
WA personal communication) 
All the major banks I am talking to are desperate to place funds in 
development projects. The reason they have all this money left over is that 
their rules are too tough, and there are not enough projects to meet their 
hurdles. (Small developer) 
The final quote highlights the way banks changed their lending practices post GFC. 
This is discussed in more detail below. 
4.1 How did the Global Financial Crisis affect the availability 
of finance? 
The ability of residential property developers to access finance varies depending on 
the position of both the business and property development cycles relative to that of 
the credit cycle. Historically, even with the cyclical nature of the credit market, many 
providers of finance in Australia actively pursued residential property development 
finance deals as they provided higher returns on funds. Where credit is readily 
available, many financiers try to maintain/grow market share. This can be achieved 
through offering higher gearing and accepting low pre-sales (Bryant 2012; Wilkinson 
et al. 2008). 
Originating overseas in 2007–08, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) caused serious 
instability on the Australian financial market and a loss of confidence in the wider 
economy. As a consequence, there were large asset value-write downs, and financial 
providers had limited liquidity and appetite for corporate lending. Without exception, 
the GFC has changed the property financing environment across all development 
entity types irrespective of scale of market capitalisation. 
The GFC caused the housing finance landscape to change significantly as many 
foreign and non-bank lenders exited the Australian lending market, clearly evident 
from Figure 10 below. In 2013, major Australian banks and their subsidiaries had in 
excess of 80 per cent of all commercial residential lending and residential term loans. 
According to the RBA (2012), part of the issue is the decline in commercial lending 
(including residential development finance) by European-owned banks. Since the 
peak in 2009, such lending has continued to shrink and has now fallen by 60 per cent, 
this being proportionately more than the decline in their total business lending. To 
some extent, the pullback can be explained by some of the banks being under 
pressure to de-leverage given the difficulties their parent groups are facing in Europe. 
By contrast, Asian banks have increased their exposures to the Australian commercial 
lending market over the past two years, though from a relatively low base. 
In addition, according to Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), a significant GFC impact is 
the unwillingness of lenders to extend credit to borrowers with which they have no 
existing relationship. Therefore, prior banking relationships form an important 
consideration for residential developers alongside an established track record of 
successful residential property development completions. 
While lending in residential development remains a conservative proposition, 
mezzanine debt in transactions receives limited support. Those offering senior debt 
require stringent inter-credit terms and conditions and can be reluctant to have 
mezzanine finance in their capital structure. The property developer needs to 
demonstrate a strong track record and high debt coverage, pre-sales etc. (Awad 
2011) to secure senior debt. 
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Besides property specific types of finance, corporate funding offers the developer 
access to alternative finance linked to the developer organisation. Corporate finance 
provides a degree of flexibility for the developer as there is no need to renegotiate 
finance on each new residential development as long they are below overall debt 
covenants. This tends to be limited to larger organisations with an established 
development track record and with substantial assets to act as security for the loans 
(see Section 4.2). Major property funds and Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) 
can fall in this category (Havard 2008; Rowland 2010). 
Even the larger organisations such as A-REITs were hit by the GFC, which caused 
them to restructure their debt to equity ratios, in many cases to satisfy their partner 
banks. Figure 11 below indicates debt to equity ratios for the major development 
companies over the period 2003–12. In the post GFC period, 2008 onwards, there is a 
general trend towards lower debt to equity ratios. 
Figure 11: A-REIT land developers debt/equity ratios 
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Figure 12: Non-A-REIT Land developers—Debt to equity ratios 
 
Although similar information is unavailable for private companies, this trend was 
overwhelmingly supported in the interviews through numerous comments confirming 
financiers’ more stringent requirements with respect to loan to value ratios. In general, 
financiers are more risk averse and more stringent in lending requirements in the post 
GFC era. 
Interviews highlighted how banks adopted a more cautious approach to bank lending 
post GFC. The most important insight for this issue was expressed in interviews with 
senior management staff of listed property developers. In explaining the different 
attitudes of banks in financing in the post GFC environment, a CEO of a listed 
company commented: 
Before the GFC we were asking for as much money as we could get. 
Nowadays we are looking at the amounts we might ask the bank for, trying to 
put the bank's hat on and ask how comfortable are they going to be? and how 
comfortable are we going to be? … we don't want to be at a point where we 
are highly geared and are going to get a call from the bank. It is probably being 
a bit more cautious and not asking banks for as much as we did in the past. 
With respect to major banks' current attitudes to project assessment, the same CEO 
commented: 
Our decisions on finance are based around project economics as [it] is the first 
layer of analysis that finance providers and the second layer is really related to 
their own set of circumstances; do they already have too much exposure in a 
location? … We like the project, but we have too much exposure already in 
that space. The analysis that they do is not dissimilar to how we approach it. 
Lenders are being much more careful and more stringent in their risk 
assessment. In addition, Basel 3 banking regulations has got them doing more 
aggregation of loans that they didn't do before. (Greenfield developer) 
When asked of the significance of the GFC, another senior representative of a listed 
development company stated: 
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Lending requirements have definitely changed. The biggest thing is when the 
market was hot and everyone had finance there was no concern with rollovers 
and reporting but now every time something changes in terms of a date you 
have to go back to the bank and they'll look at it and every time they roll over 
or extend the covenant it is about a $70 000 hit for the size of the project and 
these costs have to be passed on to consumers. 
I have not seen this stuff before in terms of availability of finance. The GFC 
created a perfect storm of risk aversion, oversensitivity and increased 
regulation. All are getting tarred with the Centro brush … It is creating brand 
contagion. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the GFC has changed the way development companies 
deal with land purchase. With respect to the environment for financing syndicated land 
development projects: 
I think we are heading back to the old traditional syndicate financing 
environment where the land is purchased with 100 per cent equity and debt 
only applies to development costs. This is how it was for many years pre-GFC 
and if we head back to that environment I don't think it will necessarily be a 
bad thing. (Greenfield developer) 
The interviews also provided significant insight into approaches taken by financiers in 
respect to loan covenants in the post GFC environment. 
When the bank is looking at our portfolio now they will apply different weights 
to land that is generating cash flow and has all approvals and pre-sales from 
land that is perhaps zoned but not underway and land that is not zoned and so 
on. So there has to be the right balance between these land types to stay 
within lending covenants …. If you are a single project company with a project 
that is not generating cash flow and you are not in a position to go out and get 
pre-sales then you are not in a position to get funding from a bank and you will 
really need equity to get you to the next level. (Greenfield developer) 
Current lending requirements are very tight but alright for quality projects and if 
you have a blended portfolio it can be good. When you hear the hard luck 
stories it is mostly the people with only one project who haven't got pre-sales 
or approvals. This is where the banks are taking a risk-averse approach. 
(Development financier) 
A senior representative from a listed property developer commented: 
In syndicated developments before the GFC debt/equity mix in a syndicated 
development was 65 per cent …. Now [you] would be lucky to get 50 per cent 
on a really good day … if it is a quality project in location then the banks will 
look at it … if it is marginal it is harder. Projects which are funded at the 
corporate level have a greater chance of going ahead. 
Bryant (2012) surveyed the major Australian banks and two lending providers to detail 
the changes in the key lending criteria for new housing supply in Queensland over the 
GFC period. Even though the work focused on Queensland, the analysis confirms the 
comments highlighted above. 
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Table 8: Changes to key lending criteria for development funding 
Key lending criteria Pre-GFC (2007) 
GFC trough 
(2008–2009) 
GFC recovery 
(2010) 
Gearing (LCR)    
Senior (%) 80–85 0–70 60–75 
Mezzanine (%) 90–100 Nil 80–85 
Equity (%) 0–20 25–100 15–20 
Pre-sales (debt coverage) (%) 0–60 100–110 80–100 
Pricing    
Senior (%) 1.5–2.2 2.5–4.5 2.5–3.5 
Mezzanine (%) 15–20 Nil 20–30 
Source: Bryant 2012 
Table 8 illustrates how banks' security requirements have increased significantly since 
the GFC. As part of the lending requirements, the emergence of more developer cash 
equity is evident. Furthermore, pre-sales can have a positive relationship to gearing 
levels: the higher the gearing, the higher the level of pre-sales required. The cost of 
debt, expressed as the margin over the bank bill swap rate, moved dramatically over 
the GFC period, as with higher cost of funds, as well as the higher pricing of risk 
(Bryant 2012). In addition, the length of debt facilities has also shortened requiring 
developers to re-finance which can prove expensive. 
Whereas debt financiers would previously provide debt facilities on three or 
perhaps five-year terms, where they are available the term is compressed to a 
much shorter term. (Allen Consulting 2011, p.9) 
Clearly the GFC has changed the lending environment from a period 'probably never 
to be repeated' (economist, major bank) to one regarded by one financier as more 
cautious and sustainable: 
So all those cowboys that were in the market, doctors, dentists, lawyers and 
accountants as well as builders and real estate agents, they didn't understand 
the market risk and banks were so desperate to supply the capital that they 
just discarded all their good lending policies they had in place and these 
people were able to go out and get a loan. I’ve seen a loan from a major 
institution in Australia lend $25 million to a 26-year-old real estate agent who 
had no experience in a project that was completely flawed from the outset. 
Their $25 million ceiling, they managed to recover about $2–$3 million of it. 
You just needed the site and proposal and you could go out and get the 
money. (Development financier)  
Thus there is an interesting contrast between those developers struggling to obtain 
funds, stating how much more difficult it is post GFC, and the banks stating they have 
'moved back to policy, not tightened' (economist, major bank). This statement 
indicates that banks lent more freely in the run up to the GFC with reduced LVRs, pre-
sale and track record requirements. However, there are no data available to examine 
lending policies in a period of relative market stability to assess the claim that banks 
have moved back to policy, whatever that policy may be. Current lending criteria may 
be more sustainable from the lenders position because it is more cautious, reducing 
the chances of bad debt and over-exposure, but there are implications for housing 
supply, particularly areas reliant on smaller scale actors. 
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4.2 Organisational structure and the availability of finance 
During the developer interviews it quickly became evident that the structure of the 
development organisation had a significant impact on the extent to which the GFC 
affected lending conditions and the availability of finance. In very simplistic terms, the 
size and structure of a developer will affect the organisation’s ability to secure credit. 
A small developer concentrating on developing and selling small infill developments, 
for example, generating a profit from such sales will obtain their finance on a project 
specific basis. When they want to undertake a development they will need to 
approach a lender to secure finance. The lender will make a decision based on the 
track record of the developer and the strength of the project itself. In this case there is 
no guarantee that the developer will be able to secure funding for a given project, 
therefore the developer seeks to arrange access to finance as soon as possible. They 
do not want to purchase a site and go through the lengthy approval process only to be 
unable to obtain finance for the construction phase of the project as this would leave 
the developer holding land, tying up vital capital that they can do nothing with. In this 
case the developer may have to sell the land to another developer who may be able 
to obtain the finance. Some developers actually base their entire business on securing 
development approval for sites and on-selling, gaining their profit from the uplift in 
value resulting from approval. However, there needs to be a market for sites with 
development approval and if finance is scarce for small to medium sized developers, 
such a market is limited. 
Small or medium sized private companies relying on project specific finance will look 
to secure a source of funding often before engaging with the landowner. This position 
is highlighted by a medium sized infill developer in Perth: 'The first thing we do is look 
for finance, before buying the site'. If a bank believes the project to be profitable they 
will agree to finance the project and the developer can proceed with the development 
process. The finance may not be required until much later in the process, usually the 
construction phase, but the developer knows it is available and can proceed with site 
acquisition and through the development approval process and draw on the loan 
when necessary. 
Large private companies or those publically listed will secure finance in a very 
different way. They will have a line of credit or corporate debt facility secured on their 
assets which they will use to fund development activities. Rather than seeking funds 
for a specific project, the organisation will use available credit to fund projects and 
may look to extend that credit, if necessary, to take on new projects. Revenue from 
completed projects will be used to pay off debt and to keep debt levels within 
acceptable limits. Organisations able to secure funding in this manner have seen less 
impact on their operations post GFC. Banks reduced exposure to property and forced 
many development companies to reduce their level of debt requiring a change of 
strategy in many cases, but finance has remained easier to access at the corporate 
debt level in comparison to smaller companies seeking project specific finance. Such 
organisations are also able to raise equity through rights issues increasing their 
access to development funds. 
Generally, larger property companies have an extensive active equity investor base, 
as property returns traditionally offer good diversification from alternative asset 
classes. The debt component is structured to optimise the property returns without 
impacting on the underlying property performance characteristics. Property 
development funding taps into the strong property company (trust structure) balance 
sheet and so lowers the cost of debt capital. According to The Allen Group (2011, 
p.13): 
  45 
Banks required one third less capital per dollar lent to higher quality A-REITs 
and listed property developers relative to mid-tier and private developers. 
These $100 million plus debt facilities pool quality commercial investment properties 
which then act as security for the riskier but more profitable property development 
projects. This allows the property company to manage the financing of a portfolio of 
property development projects, rather than financing individual stand-alone projects. 
Commonly referred to as a Multi Option Facility (MOF), it can be sourced generally for 
a defined period (five to seven years) and depends extensively on capital market 
conditions of the private and public debt sector. 
Financing options for developers depend on property and capital market conditions as 
well as developer track record, project information including end value and lender's 
(banks and non-banks) requirements. The lending market becomes more specialised 
with the increased size of residential property development. Variations in lending 
criteria can lead to different developer obligations and key financial lending hurdles, 
for example: the need for presales and the form of developer financial guarantees for 
the residential development project (Bryant 2012; Wilkinson et al. 2008). 
The remainder of this section looks at some of the advantages that major A-REITS 
and listed developers have over medium and smaller developers in terms of raising 
finance. 
4.2.1 Listed public companies 
Australian Real Estate Investment Trusts (A-REITs) permit indirect investment in a 
portfolio of property assets. In Australia there are currently three A-REITs listed in the 
ASX200 index involved in residential land development: 
 Australand Property Group (ALZ) 
 Mirvac Group stapled (MGR) 
 Stockland stapled (SGP) 
The relevant annual market capitalisation for these three companies 2003–12 are 
shown in Figure 13. 
Figure 13: A-REIT land development—Market capitalisation 
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The A-REIT structure allows investors to gain exposure to a variety of real estate 
investment opportunities diversified by market segment and geographic location. 
Major assets are held in trust structures allowing income to be 'passed through' before 
tax to investors, where income is taxed at an investor’s individual marginal tax rate. In 
addition to income from trust assets, most A-REITs also provide additional income 
from various forms of management associated with the trust assets. These are known 
as 'stapled securities' in that the security comprises a trust component in addition to a 
management component. Due to trust status there is a requirement that all income 
from trust assets be paid out in the form of distributions to investors. As a result, A-
REITs represent an investment structure characterised by high payout ratios and 
corresponding low levels of retained earnings from annual activities. 
In reviewing the recent annual reports from the above major A-REITs, a general 
characteristic is apparent whereby the majority of assets and income, 60–70 per cent, 
is devoted to recurrent income from office, retail and industrial property. The 
remaining assets, 30–40 per cent, are allocated to 'growth opportunities' and it is 
within this portfolio that residential development occurs. 
In Australia there are a number of non-REIT structured property development 
companies. An important financial characteristic of the structure allows these 
companies to retain earnings as there is no requirement from a non-trust structure to 
distribute all earnings. This allows a more conservative payout ratio policy to be 
implemented and the possibility for fully franked dividends to investors. In the post 
GFC era there have been a number of financial casualties in this area of the property 
development market. 
4.2.2 Private companies 
In this study interviews were conducted with a number of representatives from private 
development companies throughout Australia. Since annual reports for private 
companies are not available for public scrutiny, our information with respect to private 
companies is limited to information revealed in interviews. 
4.3 Raising finance 
Public companies arrange development finance through a combination of retained 
earnings, equity raisings, debt instrument issues or traditional bank lending. Some are 
also involved in retail syndication as a core part of their traditional business model (for 
example Peet Ltd). Joint-venture activities also comprise a significant portion of 
finance for individual development projects. 
Private companies arrange development finance primarily through syndication 
structures, individual private companies, trust vehicles and traditional bank lending 
sources. There is a higher proportion of mezzanine financing applying to development 
activities of private companies. 
The syndication model has been a traditional source of funding for the development of 
residential land in Australia for a number of years and is discussed in Section 5.1 
below. 
The A-REITs structure has advantages associated with a large balance sheet that 
includes many passive income producing property investments. This added security 
over the total portfolio of property assets makes the A-REIT sector attractive for major 
bank lenders and provides more advantageous lending terms and conditions. 
Within the non-A-REIT listed companies there are advantages for companies with low 
levels of debt on the balance sheet, regular stable cash flow and good levels of 
retained earnings. Companies with these characteristics and stable lower end payout 
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ratios have been able to raise additional equity from existing shareholders in recent 
years. This has been a preferred method of funding acquisitions by some companies 
together with existing dividend reinvestment and bonus share plans. 
Private developers typically have an advantage in that they are unlisted and not 
exposed to the scrutiny of the public listing process whereby funding opportunities can 
be constrained by volatility in share prices. Larger scale private developers such as 
the Investa Property Group also have the advantage of being able to access 
international funds and can enjoy the benefits, or suffer the downsides, associated 
with currency movements. Small private developers are able to compete within market 
segments not attractive to larger developers by virtue of scale. This can be an 
advantage in accessing appropriate sites matched with individual expertise of the 
development entities. Typically, development finance for these projects comprises a 
mix of debt and equity with bank lenders being more stringent on debt ratios and 
standard hurdle criteria in the form of development approvals and pre-sales. 
Among the interviewees, a number of smaller scale developers, both public and 
private, indicated the difficulties associated with purchasers obtaining finance from 
bank lenders in addition to project specific finance. This was perceived as a particular 
difficulty in achieving necessary approval criteria with respect to pre-sales, most 
notable in the affordable housing segments. 
A number of interviewees expressed the opinion that larger public companies were 
advantaged by their corporate structure when seeking finance in the current economic 
environment. 
The companies relying on the traditional project specific debt/equity model were 
typically private companies and more specifically the smaller private companies. 
However, there were some relevant comments made with respect to senior 
management staff of the publicly listed development companies that also warrant 
discussion. 
Senior staff from the main listed companies indicated in interviews that the major bank 
financiers have become more conservative in the post GFC period in regard to 
traditional project specific debt/equity models of financing land development. 
Essentially, this was related to banks’ reluctance to be exposed excessively to either 
one company or to specific geographic locations or market segments. This had led to 
a 'club' approach with the majority of new financing occurring in joint arrangements 
with several of the major banks. As an example, the CEO of a national developer 
confirmed that a recently negotiated $110 million corporate debt facility was with a 
syndicate of two major banks. 
This was also evident with respect to funding of some of the development costs of the 
larger retail syndicates. Syndication provides an advantage with respect to significant 
retail contributions of equity but banks still remained conservative with respect to 
exposure in financing development costs. 
The opinion was expressed that larger publicly listed companies received more 
favourable treatment with respect to finance applications than private companies. The 
smaller developers indicated that in some cases the traditional debt/equity project 
specific financing model was very difficult to make work with the major banks unless 
superior project strength could be demonstrated in terms of significant pre-sales and 
levels of equity contribution appropriate for required loan to value ratio standards. In 
this case, mezzanine financing was becoming more appropriate for some of the less 
bankable smaller scale developments undertaken by the small private developers. 
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5 FINANCING SPECIFIC TYPES OF DEVELOPMENT 
The cost of, and access to, finance varies by organisational structure and the track 
record of the particular developer. As a result there is also variation by development 
sector given the type of developers dominating greenfield development: large, 
national developers, and infill development; smaller scale, often local developers, to 
take just two examples. This section uses four case studies to describe the financing 
of four different types of residential development—greenfield (WA), High density 
(Victoria), medium density infill (WA), and affordable housing (national) to explore this 
variation. The case studies highlight differences in the availability of funding and how 
organisational structure is critical to the structure of financial arrangements. 
5.1 Greenfield development 
In general, the term 'greenfield development' is applied to large-scale development on 
previously undeveloped land. Typically this land is on the rural/urban fringe of major 
cities comprising large land holdings commonly referred to as 'englobo' land. This is in 
contrast to development activity whereby existing urban areas are modified or 
redeveloped, commonly referred to as 'brownfield' or urban infill development. 
Typically, greenfield development projects occur over long time frames (NHSC 2012). 
Historically, in Australia these projects have involved some participation from major 
institutional investors due to the nature of capital requirements and the duration of 
project cash flows. In greenfield development there are often lengthy periods of nil or 
negative cash flows due to long time horizons with respect to rezoning, planning 
approvals and final sale potential. 
Historically, a common model applying within Australia has involved initial major 
institutional capital from superannuation (or similar) funds whereby capital is 
introduced in the early stages to acquire the development, thereby matching duration 
of cash flows with longer term future requirements for superannuation benefits. In 
these cases, the land often required long periods before becoming 'ripe' for 
development, incurring holding costs prior to development being feasible. Often during 
the later development phase, smaller parcels of land might be sold to other 
developers for more immediate development or joint-venture arrangements negotiated 
with the original institutional landholders to facilitate final development. 
Some examples of recent and current greenfield development projects within 
Australia's major capital cities include: 
 Sydney: Elizabeth Hills (Mirvac); Waterside (Stockland); Greenhills Beach 
(Australand); Sea Crest Flinders (Peet). 
 Melbourne: Arbourlea (Stockland); Casciano Grove (Australand); Berwick Waters 
(Australand); Williams Landing (Cedar Woods); Aston Craigieburn (Peet); 
Riverstone (Satterley). 
 Perth: Meadow Springs (Mirvac); Newhaven (Stockland); Harrisdale Green (Cedar 
Woods); Shorehaven at Alkimos (Peet); Eglington (Satterley); Ellenbrook (LWP). 
Typically the developers operating in this space are major developers with a 
significant track record in land development. Three of Australia's major Real Estate 
Investment Trusts; Mirvac (MGR), Stockland (SGP) and Australand (ALZ) are 
involved in greenfield development throughout most states of Australia. In addition, 
several other major listed public companies (non-REIT structure) such as Cedar 
Woods Properties (CWP) and Peet (PPC) are involved in significant levels of 
greenfield development, again, throughout Australia. In terms of non-listed 
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development companies, private syndicates are also responsible for significant levels 
of greenfield development. An example is the Satterley group based in Western 
Australia but also operating in Victoria. The LWP property group is another private 
greenfield developer based in Western Australia but also with developments in New 
South Wales. 
Traditional finance for greenfield development projects has consisted of primarily 
equity capital. This has generally been sourced through major institutional investors 
willing to allocate portions of their investment portfolios consistent with the long-term 
nature of greenfield development. Syndication has also been a traditional source of 
equity funds (see below). 
Whereas traditional lending criteria with respect to pre-sales and loan to value ratios 
(LVRs) were still regarded as important, there was a view that specific project 
economics were not considered as important as the lender's own set of financial 
circumstances. Banks also consider geographic exposure to greenfield development 
and the stages of individual developments. Banks evaluate their overall lending 
portfolios for greenfield development with respect to different weightings for land that 
is generating cash flow from land that has approvals and pre-sales in place, from land 
that is not currently zoned for development, and so on. 
Pre-sales are considered very important, but a common view was expressed from 
various developers that strict criterion on pre-sales were impractical in some respects 
due to the transaction frameworks surrounding first-time buyers who comprise a large 
portion of the market for greenfield development: 
In some of our estates at the lower price points our purchasers just can't get 
the finance … So we can't get the capital out of the lots in order for us to 
proceed to the next stage … It is a double problem because it is the problem 
of obtaining finance on the development capital side and then the problem of 
purchasers getting finance on the retail side… These two factors are playing 
into each other and in some cases it is with the same bank. (Greenfield 
developer) 
5.1.1 Land syndication 
The land syndication model has become a firmly established system for acquiring and 
financing greenfield development in Australia. Syndication offers both small and large 
investors the opportunity to participate in ownership and development of greenfield 
land parcels. In general, the process of syndication is facilitated by an organisation 
with syndication experience (syndicate promoter). A good example is the Peet group 
in Western Australia which currently offers syndicate investments in four states of 
Australia. In most cases a land development syndicate is a single purpose vehicle 
whose major asset is the land to be developed. This enables a relatively simple 
business operating structure specifically adapted for the appropriate development of 
the land investment. 
Typically, the syndicate promoter has identified a parcel of land suitable for 
development and assessed the financial viability. Once this has occurred the financial 
structure is created usually in the form of a company or trust (managed investment 
scheme) to facilitate syndication. The syndicate promoter will generally negotiate and 
complete the purchase of the land parcel on behalf of the syndicate. 
Once land has been secured through either an option contract or outright purchase, 
relevant due diligence processes will also be organised by the syndicate promoter 
prior to preparation of prospectus documentation. The offer to participate in the 
syndicate will be made to potential investors through a relevant prospectus and 
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product disclosure statement which will be lodged with the Australian Securities and 
Investment Commission (ASIC). 
Investors wishing to participate in a syndicate complete necessary documentation 
according to the 'offer document' as detailed in the prospectus. There can be 
significant variation in the minimum and/or maximum amounts required for investment 
in a syndicate. At the time of writing, Peet syndicates were typically structured with 
investment units specified in amounts of $1 and requiring a minimum investment of 
$5000. Generally there is no maximum investment level, however syndicate 
promoters reserve the right to 'scale' subscriptions so that maximum contributions are 
capped at a certain level to enable participation by a suitable number of investors. 
Once the syndicate is fully subscribed, the syndicate promoter will form the project 
development team. All necessary planning and development approvals will be sought 
and obtained prior to construction processes commencing. 
In general, syndicate developments will vary over significant time-frames. This 
information is generally clearly stated in the prospectus documents. Typically, 
development will be staged to enable appropriate financing arrangements and to cater 
for market demand. Construction works and sale of land will proceed in a staged 
process throughout the life of the project. 
Investors in the syndicate are kept informed of progress throughout the course of the 
development with dividends paid and capital returned progressively as profits are 
earned. Payment of dividends and capital returns are at the discretion of the syndicate 
promoters who monitor cash flow, funds management and taxation requirements. 
Finally, when the development is completed the syndicate is 'wound up' and final 
dividends and returns of capital are made to security holders. 
Equity capital, through structures such as syndicates, is a preferred model for 
greenfield development, due to the certainty created with respect to timelines and 
feasibility of the project and the long lead in times being unsuited to debt funding. If 
basic equity capital is in place, then developers can proceed with necessary 
procedures for gaining development approvals in order to move the project to the 
initial marketing phase. Debt financing is the preferred option for construction works 
and generally this is achieved through shorter term debt instruments. In general, 
developers and financiers have an aversion to high ratios of long-term debt for 
greenfield development projects. 
5.2 Medium density infill development 
The term 'infill development' is typically associated with the (re)development of land 
within an existing urban area. Typically, this will be built form residential construction 
through either medium or high density zoning policies. Within the urban planning 
community, the term 'infill' can also be applied to planned community redevelopment 
or growth management programs. Infill programs often focus upon the reuse of 
obsolete buildings and sites. As an example, in recent years the West Australian 
government has facilitated infill development programs in a number of areas on land 
previously used as school sites. In most cases, the school sites have been 
transformed into planned residential communities. 
In contrast to greenfield development, one of the distinguishing characteristics of infill 
development is the project time horizon. It is often more costly for developers to 
develop urban infill sites within existing urban areas due to higher land costs 
combined with other costs involved with removing existing structures and satisfying 
infrastructure requirements such as water and power, although the issues related to 
infrastructure provision vary by state (Rowley & Phibbs 2012). Typically, urban infill 
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projects do not have long holding periods prior to development as generally the land is 
seen as being close to 'ripe' for immediate development soon after purchase. 
In many of these projects, government agencies can also be involved in the 
development and negotiation process. Landcorp in Western Australia and Urban 
Growth in New South Wales are two relevant government agencies. In general, the 
wider purpose of these agencies is to put into practice state government plans for 
urban growth and to facilitate the supply of land and built form housing in association 
with the private sector. 
Another important distinguishing feature of this type of development is the 
stratification across price segments. In most of Australia's capital cities there are high 
density infill projects which could be classified as luxury housing types. Examples 
include some Docklands projects in Melbourne, Burswood in Perth and various inner-
city localities in Sydney. Often these projects are undertaken by the largest public 
company developers (A-REITs) within Australia with the Mirvac group (MGR) being 
one of the major developers in the luxury apartment sector. Australand (ALZ) are also 
active in apartment development, tending to focus on more affordable price segments. 
On the other hand, this segment of the development market is also popular with a 
number of 'boutique' developers who tend to target more affordable market segments 
with smaller projects. The smaller developers tend to be individual state-based 
companies. Some are listed public companies such as the Finbar Group in Western 
Australia. A number of others are private companies with well-established 
development track records in their local communities. The activities of a number of 
these smaller developers tend to be highly focused and specialised by region, 
strategy and price segmentation. Some examples of infill/medium density 
development are: 
 Sydney: Maestro at Harold Park (Mirvac); Clemton Village, Clemton Park 
(Australand); The Pottery, Kingsgrove (Buildform); Air, St Leonards (Holdmark); 
Embassy Residences, St Leonards (Loftex). 
 Melbourne: Newquay Promenade (MAB Corporation); Array, Yarra Point, (Mirvac); 
Terrazzo Townhouses Richmond (Manhattan Hanson Group); St Joseph Terrace 
Homes and Warehouses (Domain Hill Property Group); Callaway Park, Sunshine 
West, (Australand); Banbury Village, St Albans (Cedar Woods); Franklin Lofts, 
Monterey, 333 Coventry St (PDG Corporation). 
 Perth: The Peninsula Burswood(Mirvac); Spring View Towers, Rivervale, AU 
Apartments, Adelaide Terrace, East Perth (Finbar Group); Cockburn Central 
(Australand); Nautilus, Rockingham (Cedar Woods); Baldivis, Maddington 
(Nicheliving). 
This sector of the development market is characterised by a wide range of participants 
in terms of financial size and structure. As noted above, three of Australia's major 
Real Estate Investment Trusts, Mirvac, Australand and Stockland, have been active in 
this market over a number of years. Scrutiny of recent financial reports and operating 
statements indicates a general tendency from these larger participants to be moving 
away from development in some of these segments, most notably the luxury 
apartment market which has experienced some difficulty in the post GFC era. 
The larger public companies arrange development finance for infill/medium density 
development in a similar manner to their other forms of development. This tends to be 
through a combination of retained earnings, equity raisings, debt instrument issues or 
traditional bank lending. Scrutiny of recent financial reports for the larger public 
companies also confirm a recent emphasis towards a variety of capital efficient 
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structures such as wholesale relationships with groups of investors, structured land 
payments, development agreements with landowners and joint-venture arrangements. 
Other than the large public companies, there are a number of medium sized 
developers, with varying financial structures, active in this market. Some are public 
companies such as the Finbar Group and Cedar Woods in Western Australia and Villa 
World Ltd operating on the east coast. There are also numerous small private 
developers who tend to be very regional in their development activities. 
Typically, the medium sized developers tend to be very focused both regionally and in 
terms of market segment. For example, one development organisation interviewed 
focuses almost entirely upon the development of medium to high density apartment 
buildings within a capital city. On the other hand, another organisation emphasised 
affordability with their target market being mainly first home owners through medium 
density house and land packages in carefully chosen infill development sites. Both of 
these groups have experienced considerable success in their activities during recent 
years. 
Within infill development there are a numerous ways to structure the development and 
secure the necessary finance. For example: 
1. One hundred per cent direct purchase by the developer using their equity. 
2. Invite equity partners and share profits which involves minimal equity from the 
developer. 
3. Joint venture with existing land owner whereby the landowner contributes the site 
as initial equity and profits are based on the value of the land as a proportion of 
total development costs. 
One of the issues identified during the interviews was securing an appropriate debt 
component to make sure that return on equity was sufficient to make the project 
profitable: 
Often with 50 per cent required equity there is not enough leverage in the 
project to achieve a suitable profit. If you want to raise equity it must offer a 
reasonable return, but without the leverage there is often not the return. This is 
especially important in the built form affordable market because the builders’ 
margin is very uniform and must be paid. If you are not a builder in the 
development, the profit margin is much less certain. (Infill developer) 
Traditionally options have been used to secure development sites but an interviewee 
commented on the difficulty of securing options on quality sites: 
You cannot secure infill land with options; owners will not look at them. The 
better the quality of an infill site the stronger the offer you have to make in 
terms of price and conditions. Everything needs to be a cash offer with no 
finance conditions. If we can do this we prefer to negotiate a longer settlement 
period with an unconditional offer so that we can do all the development 
approval work preferably eight months in advance. Once we have settled on 
the site we can move into development instantly. (Infill developer) 
The infill planning approval process is complex because of its impact on the existing 
community and infrastructure. As a result this makes it more vulnerable to planning 
delays and increased finance costs. 
5.2.1 Financial infill development post GFC 
Allen Consulting (2011) stated that infill development is particularly vulnerable to 
constraints in available finance because such development faces higher costs, needs 
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to be larger to be viable, and faces greater community resistance and potential for 
planning delays and therefore suffers from greater commercial risk. 
During the interviews it became clear that the ability of the small and medium-sized 
developers to secure funding for infill development had declined significantly post 
GFC. Even a developer with a strong history of successful development with a 
particular lender saw a sudden change: 
We had a very strong relationship with one of the major banks and a lot of 
projects with them, all successful projects. About 12 months [2011] ago they 
just stopped lending so that we have had to negotiate our latest projects with 
other lenders. (Infill developer) 
Changes to prevailing loan covenants was a recurring theme. Standard lending 
covenants with respect to pre-sales and loan to value ratios have always been in 
existence but varied considerably both during and after the GFC era. In addition the 
interviews uncovered numerous comments from development representatives 
confirming the different approaches taken by the major banks. Among the successful 
participants within this market segment, close long-term relationships with financiers 
protected them from the fate of other, similar developers who were simply unable to 
re-finance a particular development or could not obtain affordable finance for new 
development projects. 
We had arrangements with financial institutions pre-GFC where it was 20 per 
cent equity 80 per cent debt and now it is 50 per cent equity. Some of our 
projects in the later stages that look to be successful might get up to 65 per 
cent debt. (Infill developer) 
With one of the major banks we have three projects financed with them, but 
they are not going to lend anymore because we have enough exposure with 
them … We are also dealing with a smaller lender who has agreed to lend 
when our debt with our major lender is paid back. (Infill developer) 
Some banks just don't want to do residential development anymore and the 
direction comes down from the top. They don't say directly we are not lending 
to you, they just offer terms and conditions that are unacceptable and they 
know that. (Infill developer) 
Terms and conditions that were considered unacceptable tended to be imposed on 
those developers without the appropriate track record and therefore considered an 
unacceptable risk by the lender: 
If you tried to get established now it would be much harder because we started 
as a small company but the biggest problem you would have now is the need 
for massive equity, probably you would need 20x more equity now. You would 
need millions in the bank before anyone would lend you anything. (High 
density developer) 
Clearly this has implications for new entrants in the market and generally for the 
supply of small scale development projects so vital in delivering the housing within 
infill areas. Established companies have found finance available mainly due to their 
track record and relationship with the lender: 
… because we have a good relationship with the bank we are in a much better 
position to press the button on the project before other people can. (High 
density developer) 
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We are pretty low risk to the banks because we have got a history of 
successful developments and the good relationships with banks on the back of 
that. (Infill developer) 
Someone else looking to start off or move away from their comfort zone would 
have more difficulty with the banks. (High density developer) 
Banks also have specific lending policies that restrict what infill developers can and 
can’t offer to the market. In particular, minimum floor area targets have significant 
influence with a number of representatives expressing the view that financiers are 
very reluctant to participate in proposed projects where a significant proportion of units 
have floor areas of less than 50 square metres (although the actual figure will vary by 
location and what is considered acceptable to the market): 
We do innovative things all the time and you have to give them a bit of the 
story. We changed our construction method to something with a pretty good 
history in Europe and it was fine. We included studios and 44 square metres of 
these were affordable with all the facilities for $300 000. What is the issue with 
the banks with 44 square metres? It is still an issue and most of the banks 
have a minimum. (High density developer) 
… it is difficult to get funding for apartments less than 50 square metres as 
banks do not like funding small apartments …. (High density developer) 
Similarly, some interviewees thought there is a reluctance for financiers to be involved 
with new or innovative methods of construction. This is associated with financiers’ 
very close monitoring of construction expenditure throughout the course of the project 
in the building phase. 
Another significant feature of development within this segment emerged in the 
opinions of several market participants in several states of Australia. This concerned 
the financiers’ willingness to be involved in financing the construction stage provided 
that the land component of the development was virtually unencumbered. These 
comments corresponded with a number of comments from developers indicating that 
when construction works commenced there needed to be focus upon short duration 
projects. A generally preferred mode for projects was for site acquisition to be 
accompanied with a relatively long period before settlement so that full planning 
approvals could be sought without delay prior to the construction phase. 
5.2.2 Financing infill development and meeting infill targets 
The sector is characterised by fragmented sites and ownership resulting in numerous 
small development sites (Newton et al. 2011). The challenge for larger developers is 
to combine these sites into something that offers development at a scale attractive to 
them. For sites that remain fragmented it is down to the smaller developers, often 
individuals, to develop at a scale which might be anywhere from subdivision of a 
single lot to deliver two dwellings up to a 50-unit apartment development. These 
smaller developers may not be ‘professional’ developers but individuals wanting 'a 
crack at development'. Such smaller organisations that concentrate on single 
schemes due to their capacity limits, and often lack a track record, are those most 
vulnerable to scarce funding. As one developer stated: 
If small developers can't work in the space of 20 apartments then no one is 
going to do it and the banks are limiting their books and their exposure. It is 
not going to happen. (High density developer) 
Infill housing development is stimulated by price because higher revenues will equal 
higher profits, all else being equal. Therefore in a rising market there needs to be easy 
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access into the development sector to deliver a supply of housing in response to 
increased demand, evidenced through price growth. If potential developers cannot 
enter the sector and deliver the small scale developments prevalent within the infill 
space it will be very difficult to meet the sort of infill targets set out in strategic 
planning documents (Table 9). 
For example, in Western Australia for December 2012 there were around 5800 
dwelling commencements with approximately 4500 separate houses with the balance 
being multi-residential, with the exception of around 50 public sector dwellings (ABS 
2013a). Assuming these 1250 commencements can all be classified as infill projects, 
in order to increase such supply by 10 per cent there need only be five new 
developers commencing projects of 25 units. In contrast, for the same period in New 
South Wales there were a similar number of separate housing starts but over 9000 
total dwelling commencements resulting in well over 4000 infill dwellings, broadly 
defined. For a 10 per cent increase there would need to be around 16 new developers 
at 25 units each. In either case access to finance is incredibly important if capacity in 
the sector is to increase in order to drive an overall expansion of housing supply within 
existing urban areas. 
The potential to increase supply in this space is significant, but only if small scale 
developers can access the finance required to fund the development. If Perth, for 
example, is going to meet the 47 per cent infill target outlined in the Western 
Australian governments strategic planning document Directions 2013 it needs to 
increase the current proportion of infill development significantly and this can only be 
done through the entry into the market of new developers. If finance continues to be a 
barrier for new entrants, and to those developers who wish to switch from greenfield 
to infill but don’t have the necessary track record in this type of development to satisfy 
the banks, then it will be very difficult to deliver the level of housing supply envisaged 
by strategic planning documents. 
Table 9: Infill development targets 
City Strategic planning document Timeframe 
Total number 
of dwellings 
Proportion 
from infill 
development 
Sydney 
City of Cities: A Plan for 
Sydney’s Future 
2005–31 640,000 60 to 70 
Melbourne 
Melbourne 2030: A Planning 
Update—Melbourne @ 5 million 
2009–30 600,000 53 
South-East 
Queensland 
South East Queensland (SEQ) 
Regional Plan 
2009–31 754,000 50 
Perth 
Directions 2031 Spatial  
Framework for Perth and Peel 
2009–31 328,000 47 
Adelaide 
The 30-Year Plan for Greater 
Adelaide 
2010–40 258,000 50 to 70 
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5.3 High density development 
Across Australia there is a shift of emphasis in strategic planning towards higher 
density living to limit the continuous expansion of metropolitan suburbs, with the 
associated pressure on infrastructure and services. The expansion of high density 
living can be demonstrated through ABS Census data (ABS 2013b). 
Table 10: High density housing by Australian states 
 2006 2011 
NSW 70 81 
QLD 37 46 
VIC 37 39 
ACT 10 12 
WA 7 11 
NT 9 10 
SA 4 5 
TAS 1 1 
Total 175 205 
Source: Urbis 2013 
Table 10 shows the number of Statistical Area 24 locations that are predominantly 
medium and high density dwellings. This is an increase of 36 per cent from the 
previous census. As the cities evolve, governments are providing high density 
residential zones to manage high rise developments. The strategic framework can 
focus on urban renewal of private and public-owned land. In several locations, state 
governments have established specific entities to oversee land developments with 
high density residential dwellings. This includes Places Victoria—Melbourne 
Docklands, Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority—Darling Harbour, and South Bank 
Corporation—Southpoint. The approach to high density development can be 
illustrated with a case study of Melbourne Docklands, Victoria. 
5.3.1 Melbourne Docklands, Victoria 
Located adjacent to the Melbourne CBD, is the successful Docklands urban renewal 
project, centred around the banks of the Yarra River. The waterfront redevelopment 
covers approximately 190 hectares—nearly one quarter of which is water. This makes 
the Melbourne Docklands approximately the same size as the Melbourne CBD. 
Historically, at the beginning of the last century, Melbourne Docklands was handling 
an estimated 90 per cent of Victoria’s imports. Port activity started to decline in the 
1960s and in the late 1980s the government land was largely disused and had fallen 
into disrepair. In 1991, the Docklands Authority (now Places Victoria) was established 
to oversee the area’s renewal with the task of creating a development that would 
extend the western edge of the Central City enhancing the connection with the 
waterfront. 
                                               
4
 Statistical Areas Level 2 (SA2s) are defined by the ABS as medium-sized general purpose area built up 
from whole Statistical Areas Level 1 (SA1s). They replace the Statistical Local Areas (SLAs) defined by 
the Australian Standard Geographical Classification (ASGC). Their aim is to represent a community that 
interacts together socially and economically. 
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After periods of consultation and changes of state government, a consortium of 
leading property developers tendered for mixed use development opportunities in 
defined Docklands precincts. Table 11 below details the Docklands precincts and the 
successful development consortiums. 
Table 11: Melbourne Dockland precincts: Leading property development consortiums 
Docklands precincts Property developer 
New Quay MAB Corporation Consortium 
Victoria Harbour Lend Lease Consortium 
Yarra Edge Mirvac Group Consortium 
Waterfront City ING 
Digital Harbour Digital Harbour Holdings 
Source: VicUrban 2009 
Table 11 illustrates the integration of leading Australian property developers into one 
of Australia’s largest urban renewal projects. As at 2012, Melbourne Docklands had 
attracted $8.5 billion worth of private investment, 7000 residents and 29 000 workers. 
In approximately 10 years, the completed Docklands is expected to have attracted in 
excess of $17.5 billion of private investment and be the home to an estimated 20 000 
residents and 85 000 workers. 
Apartments make up an estimated 97 per cent of the Docklands dwellings with the 
remainders townhouses. Predominately along the Docklands waterfront, the 
apartments comprise five to 10 level mid-rise apartment complexes and high rise 
developments, with Victoria Point being the highest at 128 metres—42 floors. The 
apartment towers are built with a 'podium' base. Along with retail shops, the podiums 
generally accommodate car parking for building tenants, as it is more cost effective 
than basement parking due to a high water table and the soft nature of the Docklands 
soil. 
The designs of the residential apartments follow the Docklands master plan, with each 
development footprint meeting defined floor areas and height overlays. Flexibility is 
provided and each development is examined on a case-by-case basis within Local 
and state government planning guidelines. In defining the precincts, the selected 
property development consortium can be required to provide human services and 
public space, for example Docklands library, parks and children's playgrounds. 
For the development of residential apartments, Places Victoria provides development 
agreements for the land which define the terms on which the development is 
undertaken including payment and timing requirements and sunset date(s) for project 
completion. Capital controls for the property development lies with the developer, 
although project financial viability needs to be established at an early stage as a 
condition of the Development Agreement. 
Financing arrangements can vary with each of the residential development projects 
with developers responsible for arranging project finance. Any commercial financial 
arrangements under the Development Agreements vary between the Docklands 
precincts. Payments may be made either at the beginning or end of the project 
depending on the commercial arrangements in place. Development Agreement 
financing options can limit the property developer’s upfront costs. The transfer of the 
land title is completed when the conditions precedent to the development agreement 
have been successfully achieved. 
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Specific lending covenants are connected to the project construction. This extensively 
depends on the property developer's structure and size and their requirements to 
external financial sourcing for specific residential developments. Major property 
organisations commonly adopt a 'multi option facility' (MOF) offering a degree of 
financial flexibility compared to property developers funding stand-alone 
developments as a 'special development vehicle' (SDV). These aspects are separate 
to the land development agreement and are commercially sensitive. 
As an overview of the Melbourne apartment market, at the SDV construction phase, 
Australian bank senior debt is typically capped at 70 per cent loan to value ratio. The 
minimum pre-sales requirement is generally 100 per cent of the debt, with foreign 
sales at 20–25 per cent limit. In providing this information, there are reports that 
foreign banks provide more flexibility with higher foreign sales especially to overseas 
residential developers with whom they have a past relationship. 
In dividing Docklands into precincts, the successful developer consortiums can 
manage staged residential and commercial developments. Mirvac Group is 
developing the Docklands precinct south of the Yarra River. The Yarra’s Edge 
precinct when completed will cover 11 apartment towers, costing approximately 
$1.3 billion over 15 hectares. 
The sixth tower in the Yarra’s Edge precinct was completed in early 2013. Yarra Point 
has 201 apartments over 31 levels with extensive water views and overlooks one-
hectare Point Park. The selling price range was $500 000 to $2.4 million for one-
bedroom to three-bedroom apartments and the penthouse suites. At the time of the 
apartment launch, pre-sale targets were achieved within a two-month marketing 
period. There is an even mix of investors and owner occupiers in the residential 
apartment complex. 
As major residential developments are capital intensive and take considerable time, 
project finance is an important component of the development. Figure 14 below is a 
Mirvac Group illustration of the financial characteristics for a generic single stage, 200 
residential apartment project. 
Figure 14: Residential apartment development project: Financial characteristics 
 
Source: Mirvac 2012 
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Figure 15 details the stages and cash flow implications for a 3.5-year residential 
development project. While marketing and sales of the residential apartment occurs 
before the expensive construction stage, settlement is afterwards on practical 
completion. Managing building costs and time administration is critical over the 20 
months construction stage to provide the defined returns on the residential property 
development. 
5.4 Affordable housing development 
This case study examines the financing of affordable housing. In this case we use a 
very specific definition of the term ‘affordable housing’ (Milligan et al. 2004, p.5), 
referring to a specific type of housing that includes the following attributes: 
 Initiated and owned by non-government not-for-profit providers. 
 Financed through a mix of public subsidies, planning benefits, private equity 
and/or debt finance. 
 Priced at below market rents. 
 Restricted to moderate and/or low income client groups. 
The role of not-for-profit housing providers has been growing in importance in 
Australia. In recent times, various national and state governments have championed 
the role of the sector and they have been the beneficiary of sizeable stock transfers 
from SHAs. For example, the Federal Minister for Housing (Plibersek 2009) in the first 
Rudd Labor Government stated that: 
… the centrepiece of the government’s reform agenda is to facilitate the 
growth of a number of sophisticated not-for-profit housing organisations that 
will operate alongside existing state-run housing authorities. 
This view was shared by the New South Wales Minister for Housing at the time who 
stated: 
… by transferring the ownership of our properties to the community housing 
sector, we give them the ability to borrow funds to build and buy more homes. 
The fact that they own the homes gives them greater leeway in securing 
private investment. (Borger 2009) 
The research of Milligan and her colleagues has tracked the development of the not-
for-profit affordable housing development sector as it has gained momentum in 
Australia. Their first report (Milligan et al. 2004) identified that the number of active 
organisations and their property portfolios were extremely small, with the seven 
largest providers having developed around 1200 units of affordable housing over the 
preceding decade. In their second report five years later (Milligan et al. 2009, p.12), 
they concluded that: 
… since the previous study, the affordable housing businesses of not-for-profit 
providers in Australia have developed in scale, complexity and maturity. There 
are now more and larger organisations undertaking housing development 
using a range of financing, procurement and design approaches. 
The second study identified 11 established developers already procuring at modest 
scale. At the end of 2007–08, the 11 established providers owned over 5440 dwellings 
and had plans to finalise procurement of at least another 2330 in the near future. This 
represented about a 220 per cent growth in stock under the control of the leading 11 
players since 2004. This group of developers had a net asset worth of just under 
$1.3 billion in 2007–08. 
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This growth was associated with providers gaining access to some type of public 
finance, most notably the provision of a tranche of equity finance provided by the 
Victorian Government. 
A later project by Wiesel et al. (2012) also comments on the growth of the sector 
stating the advent of the National Rental Affordability Scheme (NRAS) in 2008 and the 
Social Housing Initiative (SHI) in 2009 have provided further impetus to the 
development of additional affordable housing by this sector. 
The same report provides some examples of some typical projects in a number of 
states. The projects tend to be of moderate scale of around the 30–50 dwellings 
scale. It is very difficult to obtain finance for larger projects. In the majority of cases 
the projects are 100 per cent affordable and are held by the Community Housing 
Provider (CHP) as rental projects. However, led by the success of the Brisbane 
Housing Company, who have undertaken a range of mixed developments with at least 
some of the dwellings for sale into the private market, CHPs are exploring this form of 
development. CHC Canberra, with good access to cheap government debt funds, but 
little initial equity, has used a mixed development model to significantly expand their 
portfolio over the last five years. Their most recent project, Eclipse at Bruce in 
Canberra, consist of 232 dwelling units built in a number of stages. 
After a surge in completions by the sector across the period 2009–12, with the 
completion of the Nation Building program and the tighter fiscal environment in 
Australia it has been difficult for CHOs to maintain their development momentum. 
Looking back, it is clear that the affordable housing supply delivered by the not-for-
profit sector over the period from 2005 are directly related to the sector’s ability to 
obtain finance. 
5.4.1 Finance and the affordable housing sector 
One feature of affordable housing finance in Australia is that there is not a clear policy 
framework that supports finance for the affordable housings sector. This point is well 
made by Lawson et al. (2010, p.3). 
Unlike many other similarly developed countries, Australia has not yet 
established a robust policy and institutional framework to attract and direct 
public and commercial funds towards the provision of additional affordable 
housing, despite having a well evidenced need for this. Encouraging an 
adequate flow of investment into the supply of affordable housing in Australia 
is a major challenge for all governments and for the housing industry. 
Instead finance is raised by a number of means including: 
 Use of own funds from accumulated operating surpluses including in some cases 
from market development projects. 
 Use of funds from government grant programs, most notably City West in New 
South Wales and BHC in Brisbane. 
 Debt funds from government for example. In the ACT, providers have access to a 
debt financing package from the ACT Government. A $70 million ($50 million + 
$20 million) loan facility is available to the largest CHO in the ACT—CHC 
Affordable Housing. The loans are made available at the 90-day bank bill swap 
rate on the first day of each quarter. The facilities are subject to quarterly interest 
only repayments for 10 years. The applicable weighted average interest rates for 
the $50 million and $20 million facility for the 2012 financial year were 4.92 per 
cent and 4.13 per cent respectively. 
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 Debt funds from first and second tier banks5. 
 Seeking equity funds through on-selling properties to investors under NRAS.6 
An outcome of this relatively unstructured financing model, is that private debt finance 
is expensive for not-for-profit providers. Deloitte, in a project funded by the Community 
Housing Federation of Victoria, surveyed the main CHOs in Victoria. They concluded 
that: 
All the CHOs surveyed had taken on debt to fund new housing, although the 
average loan-to-valuation (LVR) ratios vary substantially, from 12 per cent to 
65 per cent. The borrowing rates faced are less varied, with organisations 
paying between 7 per cent and 8.5 per cent with an average reported rate of 
7.2 per cent pa. This represents an average premium of about 100 basis 
points over standard variable rates charged to large businesses, or about 30 
basis points over a BBB-rated corporate bond yield (RBA 2012). (Deloitte—
Access Economics, 2011, p.9). 
Milligan et al. (2013a) confirm these Victorian findings in other jurisdictions. These 
financing arrangements place constraints on the sector’s ability to expand the supply 
of affordable housing and highlight the need for a broader policy solution to address 
this issue. A particular issue highlighted by both Milligan et al. (2013a) and McCarthy 
and Pringle (2013) was the short term nature of loan agreements leading to 
considerable transactions costs and refinancing risks for the CHOs. 
5.4.2 The approach of banks to lending to affordable housing providers7 
The major banks can see a range of positive attributes in the affordable housing 
sector including: 
 non-cyclical stable earnings 
 relatively high tangible assets 
 reinvestment of profits for growth 
 implied government support through policy 
 governance and independent oversight through regulation 
 alignment with their social responsibility charter. 
However, there are also a range of challenges: 
 access to efficient, flexible funding for growth 
 relatively low earnings 
 a lack of scale 
 inconsistencies in government policy direction 
 a lack of skilled professionals from the private sector in some cases 
                                               
5
 For example in their most recent Annual Report, BHC reports a $30 million Westpac Loan Fund and 
CHC Affordable Housing reports executing a commercial loan facility with Westpac Banking Corporation 
($25 million) for the construction of its new Eclipse development. 
6
 Again, BHC has probably been the most active in this space. See for example its brochure pitching to 
small investors at <http://www.bhcl.com.au/assets/NRAS/BHC-NRAS-Brochure-July-2012-Low-Res.pdf> 
although CHC Canberra is also seeking investors for its most recent Eclipse development. 
7
 This section is based on a seminar delivered by McCarthy and Pringle (2013) and interviews with senior 
bank officials. 
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 the difficulty of recovering loan funds because of the inability to evict low income 
tenants. 
The ideal borrower is seen as a CHO with an emphasis on sustainability, with an 
experienced professional management team and an independent board with a 
relevant mix of skills. The CHO must also be focused on transparency and disclosure 
and have the appropriate approvals from the existing regulatory system. The bank will 
need to see a strategy to manage interest rate volatility and usually place a covenant 
on the loan that sets a minimum interest rate cover. 
In the words of a property loan officer from a major bank: 
We are getting to know the affordable housing sector and we can see some 
future opportunities in the sector, but we need to understand their cash flows 
in greater detail because we won’t be in a position to recover properties if 
loans get into trouble. 
As a result loans are primarily based on available operating cash flows. This restricts 
the LVR on most developments. This means that the potential of not-for-profit 
providers to leverage off public sector assets that they have received from SHAs is 
limited because of the low incomes of their tenants. The size of the positive operating 
cash flows in their businesses are not large enough to support significant private 
sector debt finance. This suggests that some of the previous optimism about the 
ability of stock transfer to 'leverage' significant new housing supply has been 
misplaced, especially when the available finance is ad hoc and expensive. 
The major banks are getting less concerned about the impact of affordable housing 
within a market development as they get to know the sector better. While there are 
some concerns about market risk, this has largely been overcome by the successful 
development outcomes for large mixed use developments undertaken by the Brisbane 
Housing Company and CHC Canberra. Both those organisations have been able to 
secure large debt funds from a variety of first and second tier banks. However, this 
issue might still be a concern in particular projects, especially when the bank has no 
comparable projects to price the marketing risk. 
5.4.3 The impact of the GFC on affordable housing providers8  
While the GFC generated very negative outcomes for many developers, there has 
been a mixed impact on affordable housing developers. On the negative side, loan 
terms have shortened exposing providers to increased transactions costs and 
refinancing risks. On the other hand, providers have also had the advantage of the 
nation building scheme which has strengthened their balance sheet as well as 
improved their development experience. Moreover, for affordable housing developers 
with existing variable interest loans, the lower interest rates available since the GFC 
have had major positive impacts on their interest costs. 
5.4.4 Affordable housing finance examples 
In order to understand the range of financing strategies for CHOs, three recent 
projects are described below. The first project is a high rise development in 
Melbourne, which was featured in a previous AHURI study (Milligan et al. 2013a). 
Note that the name of the development has been changed to maintain privacy. The 
second project is a medium density in-fill project in Western Australia. It uses a range 
of mechanisms to reduce the debt exposure of the CHO. The last project is a high rise 
                                               
8
 This section is based on a seminar delivered by McCarthy and Pringle (2013) and interviews with senior 
bank officials. 
  63 
apartment building constructed by City West Housing in Sydney. It is unusual in that 
no debt financing was required for this project. 
The Barwon—Melbourne 
The Barwon is a project examined in detail in Wiesel et al. (2012 pp.42–45) and is 
located on a busy commercial strip in a metropolitan inner city location with excellent 
access to shops, public transport and services. The site is approximately 0.13 
hectares, has a street frontage to the north, and is neighboured by buildings ranging 
from two to 11 storeys in height. The project comprises two main buildings. To the 
north of the site, fronting the street, there is a two-storey early 20th Century 
commercial building. To the rear of the commercial building has been inserted a new-
build seven-storey apartment building. This apartment building is accessed from a 
side laneway, and has two lifts providing access to all levels. On the ground floor, 
there is a cycle lock-up and communal room for resident meetings and gatherings. 
Levels 1–7 are purely residential in use; they provide a total of 71 dwellings—36 
(50%) of these are self-contained studio units, 12 are one-bedroom units (17%) and 
23 (32%) are two-bedroom units. The project was completed in 2011. 
The project was financed with a mix of government grants (75%), a commercial loan 
(20%) and other equity (5%) which included a small donation and internal surpluses 
and reserves. The loan has a 25-year term and a variable interest rate. The rate was 
higher than the rate charged to large businesses. At the start of the project, debt 
servicing costs were significant but manageable at around 55 per cent of net rental 
income. However, the decreases in interest payments since then would have reduced 
the debt load considerably. 
The project demonstrates how large government grants are needed to be able to 
finance large affordable housing apartment developments with 100 per cent retention 
for affordable housing. 
 Eaton project—near Bunbury in Western Australia 
This project was developed by Access Housing in Western Australia. Details of the 
project were extracted from the company’s 2012 annual report (Access Housing 2012, 
p.14). The project is a $5.5 million project of 25 senior villas (inclusive of land cost) 
which is being delivered in two stages. The project is an excellent example of 
packaging together different funding streams and offsetting finance costs. It is a 50:50 
joint venture between a local builder and Access Housing. 
 Eight stage 1 dwellings were pre-sold at a 20 per cent discount to the Department 
of Housing to reduce the debt exposure of the JV partners. The department will 
on-sell these dwellings using its shared equity product. 
 Thirteen stage 2 dwellings with NRAS incentives attached are being sold into the 
investor market. These sales are a house and land contract, whereby the investor 
purchases the land component up front and then makes progress payments direct 
to the builder during the construction, limiting the debt exposure to the JV parties. 
This mechanism demonstrates the financing benefits of this sort of housing type 
compared to apartment developments whereby no sales revenue is available to 
the developer until a certificate of completion is issued. 
 Access housing is applying its share of the profits to purchase the remaining four 
dwellings and retain these for social and affordable rentals. 
Access Housing’s maximum debt exposure on this $5.5 million project is only 
1.3 million. 
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35 O’Dea Ave Zetland—New South Wales 
The total cost of this project was $19.3 million. It was entirely equity financed by City 
West Housing who are in the unusual position of having an income stream from 
residential and commercial development contributions in the City of Sydney. They 
also have a policy of housing low, medium and high income tenants and, as a result, 
also generate a considerable surplus on their rental operations. In their most recent 
annual report (2011–12) they note that they received $6.2 million from this source as 
well as interest payments of $4.1 million, largely based on the interest paid on their 
accumulated developer contributions. 
This source of funds means that no debt financing is required. However, it also means 
that it takes some considerable time to accumulate enough funds to begin the 
construction of a new project. In recent years there has been about a three-year gap 
between project completions. City West currently has developed 547 dwellings which 
they have retained in their rental program, with about another 200 dwellings in the 
pipeline due for completion in 2014–15. 
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6 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Residential finance lending policies are defined and implemented by the lending 
institutions themselves. In this respect housing and urban policy-makers are largely 
powerless to directly influence finance outcomes. Banks and other financial 
institutions will base their lending decisions around an organisational strategy and if a 
development project meets the risk to return assessment of the institution, and fits 
with this overall strategy, then the bank will lend to the developer. However, there are 
ways that policy-makers can influence the potential risk of a development and make 
lending to residential projects more attractive. Thus policy-makers can indirectly 
influence funding strategies and potentially address finance as a blockage within the 
development process. 
This chapter discusses seven potential policy implications drawn from this research. 
6.1 All developers are different 
This report highlighted the range of developers active in the Australian housing supply 
sector and the differences between developers in terms of accessing finance. The 
larger, publicly listed companies, including those with a REIT structure, seem to have 
few difficulties securing finance. Major, national developers focusing on greenfield 
development have largely been unaffected by finance constraints, although there are 
exceptions due to some lenders reducing overall exposure to this type of development 
and in specific locations. In contrast, smaller developers working on smaller scale 
projects, often of an infill nature requiring project specific funding, were experiencing 
much more difficult conditions. 
Variation in the size, organisational structure and operational characteristics of 
developers is important from a policy perspective because different types of 
developers will respond differently to a range of policy settings. For example, a policy 
making the purchase of new apartments exempt from stamp duty may be positive for 
a smaller scale, infill type developer who may see demand rise, but may have a 
negative impact on a land developer. If policy-makers want to stimulate housing 
supply in a particular housing sector then they need to be aware of the type of 
developers operating in that space and introduce policies that will have the maximum 
impact on that particular type or scale of developer. 
6.2 Understanding development feasibility 
Policy-makers need to understand just how their decisions affect residential lending. 
Policy settings influence potential development returns and the perceived risk of 
development. Section 3.2 of this report explained how development feasibility is 
calculated. This stage of the development process determines whether a development 
scheme is potentially profitable, if it is not then the scheme will get little further than an 
excel spreadsheet let alone reach the development approval stage. If the developer 
does consider the scheme potentially profitable they then have to persuade the bank 
to make the funds available. The bank will also look closely at the potential scheme 
profitability and also the level of risk involved in lending. If the risk is considered too 
high the lender may refuse to lend or impose loan covenants which may not work for 
the developer. 
Any variable that reduces uncertainty within the development process will have a 
positive impact on the way a lender assesses a potential development project. 
Decisions that make development more profitable will also have a positive impact on 
the chances of that development going ahead. By creating the conditions for 
profitable, low risk, development, policy-makers are increasing the potential for 
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housing supply. Any decision that adds to uncertainty, costs or reduces revenue will 
have the opposite affect and reduce the potential for housing supply. 
As an example, from the developer’s perspective strategic planning decisions should 
take into account development viability and ensure that policies that will make 
development unprofitable, for example density restrictions or imposing minimum 
heights in low value areas, are avoided. If policy-makers are aware of how developers 
make decisions then they can help deliver plans that are likely to maximise housing 
supply. The greater the chances of profitable development the lower the risk and the 
greater the probability of banks being willing to lend on development projects. Policy-
makers therefore need to be aware how their decisions can affect potential revenues, 
costs, risk and profitability within a development. 
6.3 Impact of funding constraints on urban policy 
Post GFC the major supply constraints generated by a lack of access to finance have 
been in the small infill development sector, particularly for those developers operating 
in the lower land value sections of the city providing dwellings at the more affordable 
end of the scale. Many of these 'developers' have returned to their other occupations 
because they are now unable to access finance. These small in-fill developers often 
have lower profit margins and often use family labour chains to reduce construction 
costs. As a result they are able to deliver affordable housing opportunities. A second 
impact has been the increased focus on pre-sales, especially for pre-sales with a 
larger deposit. This has restricted access for first-home buyers seeking an affordable 
product in the new dwelling market. It is likely that these two trends acting together will 
have reduced the access of moderate income households to the new dwelling market, 
outside the traditional greenfield development opportunity. 
The importance of residential finance is likely to increase over time as strategic policy 
focuses on infill dwelling supply and the traditional greenfield development dominated 
by the separate house becomes a smaller component of total new dwellings built in 
Australia. Traditional greenfield developments are constructed in stages and do not 
require the level of construction finance required for apartments, for example. Peak 
debt exposure for a 100-unit apartment complex is significantly higher than for a 100-
unit lot development. 
Policy-makers therefore need to create the conditions that enable developers to 
deliver profitable, low risk development. This is through certainty in the development 
approval process, avoiding delays and unnecessary complications; equitable 
infrastructure charging and flexibility around issues such as parking requirements 
which can add significant costs to developments and render them unprofitable. 
Reducing risk and creating such an environment will make such lending more 
attractive to financial institutions. 
6.4 De-risk schemes through joint ventures 
Linked to the above, local and state government can aid developers where possible 
by creating joint ventures to help reduce potential development risk, again making a 
scheme more attractive to potential lenders. Joint ventures could be structured in a 
number of ways and there are existing examples all over the country but particularly in 
Western Australia through initiatives of the Department of Housing. Such initiatives 
include the use of government-owned land; government guarantees to purchase 
unsold units; pre-sales to government and direct profit sharing partnerships. Such joint 
ventures can not only help government meet their housing targets and deliver a range 
of affordable housing outcomes but can make developments than lenders may not 
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previously have funded feasible and help grow the track record of smaller developers 
considered so important by financial institutions. 
6.5 The not-for-profit sector 
There has been considerable work discussing ways to attract institutional funding in 
the not-for-profit and private rental sectors. Work by Lawson et al. (2010, 2012, 2013) 
and Milligan et al. (2013a) identifies a number of ways in which institutional 
involvement in both sectors would have positive housing supply outcomes. Attracting 
institutional investment into the area of affordable housing would have numerous 
positive outcomes for both the development sector and end consumers. Any policy 
measures that facilitate such institutional involvement would be a significant step 
forward. 
If there is a political will to increase new housing completions by the not-for-profit 
sector in Australia, then the sector will require significantly improved access to 
residential finance. Current completions by the NFP sector in comparison to many 
other OECD countries are very limited and unlikely to change unless better financial 
mechanisms are developed (Lawson et al. 2010). Many community housing 
organisations are developing housing on a relatively small scale through leveraging 
their existing assets. The more assets they have to leverage against the more money 
they can borrow and the more units deliverable. This is a powerful argument for the 
further transfer of state housing assets to the community housing sector which can 
concentrate on growing the sector through efficient use of the publicly-owned housing 
stock to leverage the necessary finance for expansion. 
6.6 Demonstrating the potential of alternative housing 
products 
Alternative models of housing supply and ownership through community land trusts 
and shared equity schemes, for example, have the potential to deliver positive 
outcomes. One of the barriers to growth in this area is a reluctance of banks to lend 
money to alternative products. It is up to government to demonstrate that such models 
are effective and can be low risk investment opportunities. The Department of 
Housing in Western Australia have their Keystart low deposit scheme and shared 
ownership home loan scheme that have been successful in helping thousands of low 
to moderate income individuals and families into home ownership. Lending to 
individuals who might not otherwise have been able to access the private market, the 
Government of Western Australia has demonstrated that such lending is low risk and 
has positive social outcomes. There is a powerful argument for the adoption of similar 
programs elsewhere. The success of shared ownership schemes should encourage 
the private sector to explore how they could develop such schemes enabling access 
to market housing that would previously have been unavailable to many households. 
Innovation needs to come from government because of the reluctance of developers 
to take on projects with perceived high levels of risk and, more importantly, the 
reluctance of lenders to finance projects with such additional risk. 
6.7 Involving the financial sector in planning reform 
Given the key role of residential finance in delivering new housing supply and the 
objective of planning reform in many states is to increase the supply of new housing, it 
is important to include the residential finance sector in planning reform consultations. 
There is not a lot of evidence that this has occurred to date in Australia. For example, 
what aspects of the planning system create the most uncertainty and therefore have a 
negative impact on risk and how can they be removed? How can the system be made 
more certain to reduce the potential for delays and the associated cost impact on 
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profitability? Reducing risk will not only lead to more positive lending decisions but 
might also have an impact on the loan covenants imposed on developers, again 
making development potentially more profitable. 
Although policy-makers are powerless to influence the strategy and institutional 
practices of financial institutions, the discussion above highlights how they can 
potentially increase housing supply through creating the conditions where finance is 
less of a barrier to housing delivery. Understanding how finance decisions are made 
and how developers make decisions is a vital step in creating the policy conditions 
that will have a positive impact on housing supply. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: List of interviewees 
Role in organisation Type of organisation Location Date 
Managing Director Large listed developer—- 
Greenfield 
Perth but also 
operate nationally 
November 2012 
Managing Director Large private developer—- 
Greenfield 
Perth  August 2013 
General manager Medium private developer— 
high density infill development 
Perth August 2013 
Development manager Community Housing Association Perth July 2013 
Managing Director Medium private developer—
medium density infill 
development 
Perth November 2012 
Chief Operating Officer Large listed developer—
Greenfield 
Perth but also 
operate nationally 
November 2012 
Development manager Large listed developer—
Greenfield 
Perth but also 
operate nationally 
November 2012 
Regional manager National bank Perth November 2012 
Chief economist National bank Perth November 2012 
Senior Development 
Manager 
Large private developer—
Greenfield 
Melbourne but 
also operate 
nationally 
October 2012 
Finance Consultant Large private project manager—
high-rise developments  
Melbourne October 2012 
Managing Director Medium private developer—
medium density infill 
developments 
Melbourne October 2012 
Managing Director Small private developer—small 
multi-unit infill developments 
Melbourne—
specific suburb 
October 2012 
Director Independent finance broker Melbourne October 2012 
Director Small private developer—
suburban infill 
Sydney October 2012 
Director Medium private developer—
medium density infill 
developments 
Sydney December 2012 
Director Medium private developer—
medium density infill 
developments 
Sydney November 2012  
Director, Property 
Finance 
National Bank Sydney October 2012 
Property Finance officer National Bank Sydney March 2013 
CEO Not-for-profit developer Sydney October 2012 
Development Manager Community Housing Association Sydney November 2012 
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Appendix 2: Glossary of common finance terms 
Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV) 
For property developers, separating projects in separate entities, provides a logical 
structure for legal and financial purposes. This ‘stand-alone’ entity is commonly 
referred to as a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). It provides the structure for 
agreements and contracts between lenders, developer and other interested parties 
and is the arrangement for financial payments. 
Multi Option Facility (MOF) 
Consists of an overall debt limit that may be made-up of a number of assets. The 
MOF offers a degree of flexibility above that received for a single asset debt facility. 
The benefit of having an MOF is there is no need to renegotiate the contact each time 
you sell/acquire an asset. Provides major property organisations with an investment 
and development portfolio to a funding opportunity with assets forming a range of risk 
profiles. 
Loan to Value Ratio (LVR) 
The percentage of end development value that forms a basis of how much a lender 
will advance to a developer. For example, if a project has an end value of $10 million, 
and the bank has an LVR limit of 80 per cent, then the maximum that will be lent is 
$8 million. This ratio offers protection against projects where end revenue outcomes 
are well below those expected. The higher the loan to value ratio, the higher the risk 
to the lender. During the GFC, many lenders lowered their LVR from 80 per cent to 70 
per cent, this limited debt in the example to $7 million and so requires additional 
$1 million equity if the project has an end value of $10 million. 
Loan to Cost Ratio (LCR) or Loan to Development Cost (LDCR) 
The percentage of the development building cost (excluding developer profit) that 
forms a basis of how much a lender will advance to a developer. For example, if a 
project has an end value of $10 million, a building cost of $9 million and has an LCR 
limit of 80 per cent, then the maximum that will be lent is $7.2 million. This ratio 
protects the lender from an increase in building costs. If the LVR limit was lowered to 
70 per cent, then the maximum loan would be $6.3 million on the example above. 
Development margin 
The development margin is the percentage return of net profit divided by total 
development cost. For example, if a building costs $9 million and the end value (less 
fees etc.) is $10 million, then there is an 11 per cent development margin. 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 
An important measure of investment return, is the discount rate that produces a net 
present value (NPV) of zero. If the IRR is above the developer’s target rate of return a 
project would be regarded as profitable. The IRR takes into consideration 
assumptions on the effect of time, incomes, costs, end development value and a 
discount rate. Lenders particularly examine the forecast end development value, 
discount rate and interest rate with input sensitivity analysis. IRRs will vary depending 
on location and developments. 
Equity IRR 
When projects are funded using a mix of equity and debt, the equity investor would 
like to estimate the rate of return on equity, after debt costs and payments are 
removed. Hence equity IRR is essentially the leveraged version of the project IRR. If 
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the project is 100 per cent debt funded, then no equity IRR will exist. Where the 
project IRR is greater than the cost of finance, the equity IRR will exceed the project 
IRR. Where the project IRR is less than the cost of finance, the equity IRR will be less 
than the project IRR. 
Gross Realisable Value (GRV) 
This is the gross amount of sales a development could achieve. For example, if you 
have 20 units to sell at $500 000 each, then your GRV would be $10 million. 
Importantly, where applicable, goods and service tax (GST) is deducted to achieve 
the GRV. 
Net Realisable Value (NRV) 
This amount is the net value of sales; less the amount of GST (if applicable) paid on 
sales, less any selling costs (commissions paid to real estate agents). For example, if 
you have 20 units to sell at $500 000 each, then your GRV would be $10 million and if 
selling costs are 5 per cent, then the NRV is $9.5 million. 
Interest cover 
Interest cover is equal to earnings divided by finance costs. An example of this is 
where the rental return is $150 000 per annum and the interest on the loan is 
$100 000 per annum, the interest cover is 1.5 times. 
Equity 
Equity is an important property development finance component. It offers property 
ownership with returns based on the property development less costs that include 
debt financing—for example, if a project has an end value of $10 million, building 
costs of $9 million and a debt of $7 million. The initial $2 million equity increases to 
$3 million on the successful completion of the development. 
Senior debt 
This is the main loan category on a property development project. Depending on the 
specific development and market conditions, senior debt is usually available up to 
70 per cent of completed project value (or 80% of project costs). Senior debt together 
with a mix of either (or both) of mezzanine and equity funding provides 100 per cent of 
the project cost. 
Mezzanine finance 
This represents the debt financing of a project above the senior debt limit and is 
usually at a premium rate of interest—for example, if a project has an end value of 
$10 million, building costs of $9 million and senior debt of $7 million. If available initial 
equity is $1 million, then mezzanine finance of $1 million is sourced to bridge the gap 
between project cost of $9 billion and the senior debt and equity of $8 million. 
Risk mitigation 
This is the opportunity to limit an exposure to possible property development risks. 
This can include improved identification and measurement of property development 
risks alongside the management of risk with improved knowledge, insurance and the 
possible transfer risk—joint ventures. 
Interest only loan 
Finance for property developments generally operates as interest-only. This is a 
property-backed loan where none of the principal sum is paid back until the end of the 
loan period. The borrower only paying interest on the loan. 
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